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## CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

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# The Passions

*Robert A. Kaster*

### I Introduction

Literature, at any rate Roman literature, is all about action in the material world, as it is prompted by the value placed on external things. Humans (and gods too, who are no different here) act because they seek to gain goods or avoid evils, or because they have already gained things they prize or have had things they decry thrust upon them. Literature merely (though not simply) clothes these patterns of motive and action in the forms and fabrics of language that tradition or fashion provides: comedy, epic, tragedy, history, lyric, romance... And as the Stoics warned, when we invest external things with value and act to secure or enhance that investment, our actions will inevitably be shaped by 'the passions': love, hate, fear, envy, shame, and their brothers.

In this obvious sense the story of the passions in Roman literature just is the story of Roman literature; and in that sense, any attempt to survey the subject in a brief essay must bite off much more than it can chew. My plan is not to attempt such a survey but instead to consider three topics that can provide some useful perspectives even when treated in the broad strokes needed here: what might be called the Romans' cultural intuitions about the passions; the role that these intuitions played in rhetoric; and the links between rhetoric and imaginative literature in representing and evoking the passions. Along the way we shall see how both rhetoric and literature start from much the same understanding of how the passions work – especially the passions' grounding in certain kinds of judgement and evaluation – and how both rhetoric and literature can create, through their appeals to the passions, the sense of shared understanding and sentiment that is integral to a common culture. 'Reading the passions' can then be seen to provide a valuable entry into texts and the culture they reflect and constitute.

## 2 Roman Concepts of Passion

The Romans' intuitions about the passions will look familiar, because they are largely ours; and our intuitions are what they are in no small part because the Romans came before us. Most important is the view – universal save for the Stoics – that the passions are 'natural' and so inevitable. As human beings (on this view) we are put together in such a way that the experience of *ira* (anger) or *metus* (fear) can no more be avoided than can hunger and headaches. Yet though the passions are at base a given, that does not mean that they are not 'up to us' in consequential ways. Most important, it is possible to experience a passion either appropriately or inappropriately – a statement that cannot be made of a purely bodily 'feeling' such as hunger. In Aristotelian terms congenial to the standard Roman view, the idea is to achieve the mean in your passions: to experience the right passion for the right reason (as a fitting response to the given state of affairs), for the right length of time, with the right intensity, and with the right combination of pragmatic and expressive behaviours.

With talk of 'right' the passions cease to be merely 'natural' and become a product and concern of culture. Coordinating all the vectors of rightness is one of the primary aims of proper socialization; or in more recognizably ancient terms, achieving the mean in your passions is one of the components of virtue. When Catullus depicts the Spaniard Egnatius wearing a broad smile at a funeral (39.4–6), we understand that the man has at least failed to master the correct expressive behaviours: as a result, he is no better than an outlandish fool, and might well be a knave. Right behaviours could come only through extensive training and acculturation, of the sort that natives acquire mostly just by virtue of being natives (that is part of Catullus' point). But more fundamental than such behaviours, and so more important as an object of training, is the habit of experiencing the right passion for the right reason.

Your father has been assaulted: what is your response? The answer depends in the first instance on the value you attach to your father, which in the standard case will be both considerable and multifaceted: you will value your father highly, and for more than one reason (as a person to whom you owe your life, as a person who has shown you love, as a person who has instructed you, as a person whose role has symbolic importance in the culture you have integrated with your self...). You will, accordingly, feel *ira* – a painful desire for revenge – because someone whom you prize has been subjected to *iniuria*. This will be a fitting response to the given state of affairs (unless you are a Stoic: Sen. *Dial.* 3.12.1–2), and it is important to recognize its basis: your *ira* here will not be 'instinctive' but will result from a cognitive process – a chain of judgements and evaluations – that is both complex and culturally determined (if you doubt this, for 'your father has been assaulted' substitute 'your sister has been complimented by a stranger'). The passions, on this view, take their start from judgements and evaluations that

are forms of reason shaped by culture; and learning to match up reasons and passions so that they fit is part of what we have come to call acculturation.

But were cognition the whole story, we would merely have *dispassionate* consideration of experience ('Someone is abusing that older gentleman, who is tied to me in various ways. Surely that is wrong, for various reasons'). What follows cognition was the hard part, for the Romans as it is for us. The *feelings* engaged in body and mind by certain judgements and evaluations are essential to the ways in which the passions are experienced; indeed, these feelings are the components of experience that give the 'passions' their English name, from Latin *passio*, which in turn corresponds to *πάθη* (*pathe*), the standard Greek term to denote what one simply experiences, helplessly or at any rate beyond intention. These are the feelings that 'come over' us, making our chests tighten and fists ball in anger or our hearts swell and tears well in joy. The non-cognitive components of passion that we call 'feelings', like other non-cognitive feelings such as hunger, seem least to be 'up to us': for this reason they caused the Romans (as they cause us) to speak of passion as a 'seizure' or even as a form of 'madness'.

Hence the fundamental mystery of the passions. They start in an exercise of reason, leading to relevant evaluations and judgements, but they are commonly experienced as opposed to reason: at best as phenomena that we wish reason would control – calibrating their intensity and duration and the behaviours they cue (so that not every episode of *ira* ends in murder) – or at worst as wholly beyond the control of reason (so that murder does sometimes ensue). In the moment of passion, the mind is often experienced as a thing divided against itself, and this intuition underlies the most common explanation of the passions in ancient psychology, as the consequences of a mind that is literally segmented into a reasoning 'part' that must struggle to exercise control over an appetitive 'part' in which the passions arise (see esp. Plato *Rep.* 4.435C ff.).

### 3 The Passions and Rhetoric

The division between the cognitive (judging, evaluating) and the non-cognitive (desiring, feeling) dimensions of the passions finds its way into Roman rhetorical theory, which seeks first of all to engage cognition, the better to profit from feeling. As we shall see, however, rhetoric prefers not to dwell on what I have called the passions' 'mystery'. As an *ars* – a technique built on reason – rhetoric is above all about creating reasoned judgements in the minds of its audience. It just happens that many of these reasoned judgements are the starting point of passions.

There are two primary reasons why rhetoric should be our next stop on this *tour d'horizon*. First, it is in rhetoric that we find the earliest comprehensive discussion of the passions, and one of the most penetrating. In the second book of his *Rhetoric* Aristotle surveys the psychological states that the orator might encounter, or wish to create, in his audience and in so doing stresses strongly the

cognitive underpinnings of the passions: thus pity (*eleos*), 'a kind of pain caused by seeing an undeserving person suffer a destructive or painful harm' (2.8.2), and its opposite, indignation (*nemesis*) 'being pained at [another's] undeserved success' (2.9.1), both start from a reckoning of 'desert'. Whether or not the attention given the subject by Aristotle continued to be prominent in the (now lost) handbooks of Hellenistic rhetoric we do not know; but the attention is certainly present (if in somewhat different application) in the earliest works of formal rhetoric at Rome, from Cicero's *De inventione* (1.98–109) through his *De oratore* (2.185–211) and on to Quintilian's *Institutio* (6.1–2). The second reason for our attention here has to do with the background of those who wrote the texts to which the present volume is a 'companion'; for the vast majority of these (almost exclusively) men wrote after formal rhetoric was introduced to Roman culture and so knew the discipline as part of their education. Having been schooled in rhetoric, they inevitably based their own writings upon it, in the approach to the passions no less than in other ways.

Now there were nuances in the approach of different rhetorical doctrines to the passions, but uniting them all was one central supposition: the appeal to the passions was ethically unproblematic. Nowhere in Roman rhetorical writings do we find squarely addressed the concern that rousing the passions for argument's sake might be undesirable, either in itself – for example, because passion (as the Stoics believed) is a deformation of the right reason that is godlike in us – or in pursuit of some larger aim – for example, the accurate administration of justice (Quintilian barely glances in this direction at *Inst.* 6.1.7). This lack of concern is crucial both for rhetoric and for literature, and so it is worth lingering a moment over it, to consider its causes. Here I would stress two reasons, though there are certainly others.

First, there is the relation between rhetoric and life. Much of formal rhetoric did no more than systematize and analyse what people said and did as they went about their everyday affairs: crafting arguments (e.g.) according to the letter versus the spirit of an agreement, or vice versa, belonged to a particular province of rhetoric ('status-theory'), but arguments of that sort had presumably been used since the first agreement begat the first disagreement. So too with rousing the passions in order to press one's case. Any ancient city on any given day would have presented a lively theatre of passionate display and appeal, from the semi-ritualized institution of the *flagitatio* (in which an aggrieved party followed a tormentor through the streets, heaping on him abuse intended to shame him into repentance), through the occasions when mourning dress was assumed (e.g. by the family of a defendant in court) to gain onlookers' pity, to the ways in which (under the principate) the emperor's image could be used to arouse indignation and ill-will against a personal enemy. That life and rhetoric should be kept distinct in this regard would have seemed bizarre.

At the same time, formal rhetoric was cushioned against self-examination by what might be called its doubly cognitive orientation. If you commanded

rhetoric's tools, you were confident that you knew which judgements and evaluations were suited to arousing which passions, and you set about creating those cognitions in the judges' minds. But your expertise did not end there: for you were also confident that you knew which judgements and evaluations were suited to *allaying* the passions as well. For this reason Roman *consolationes*, intended to comfort the bereaved in their mourning, can seem downright chilly to a modern reader. The orator is a man who can orchestrate the emotions of the court, now mobilizing them, now calming them, much as a musical maestro calls on the reeds or the brass arrayed before him to play now *forte*, now *piano*. That the 'instruments' might take on a life of their own and gallop away uncontrolled is a thought that simply does not occur.

Rhetoric's very limited concern with the ethical dimension, combined with its strongly cognitive orientation, also meant that it did not deeply probe an interesting question: why bother? If you wish the judges to find for a complainant who alleges that he has suffered undeservedly, you will seek to arouse their *miserericordia*, 'pity', which depends precisely on a recognition of undeserved suffering; in the same way, if you wish the judges to find that the accused has behaved outrageously by using his advantages to abuse one or another social norm, you will seek to arouse their *invidia*, 'ill-feeling', which depends precisely on a finding that personal advantages have been abused in this way (cf. Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.22 ~ *Auct. ad Her.* 1.8, sim. Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.14 and 6.1.14). But if you can bring the judges to conclude that A has suffered undeservedly or that B has abused his advantages, why is that not sufficient? What added value is derived from having the psychosomatic experience of pity or indignation ride piggy-back on these judgements?

I assume that anyone reading this chapter has experienced passion in an argumentative setting and so will be able to propose reasons why the tactic worked, starting with the fact that our psychosomatic feelings, having once supervened upon judgement, tend to strengthen that judgement even in the face of good evidence and arguments to the contrary (Quintilian suggests a variant of this at *Inst.* 6.2.6). But I will round off this stage of our discussion by suggesting a less obvious reason, and a less obvious sort of work that the passions performed, thanks to the social context in which rhetoric operated. When a speaker sought to arouse *miserericordia* or *invidia* or *ira*, there was often at least one other passion that he tacitly sought to engage as well: the *pudor*, 'sense of shame', of the judge himself, the desire to see oneself being seen in a creditable light, and to avoid being seen otherwise. Being persuaded to judge that the person before you has suffered undeservedly will cause you to experience the feelings associated with *miserericordia*; and experiencing those feelings tends to confirm not only the judgement itself, in a kind of cognitive loop (if I feel this way, the person before me must have suffered undeservedly), but also your own identity as the sort of person who feels pity or indignation *appropriately*. Indeed, given the group setting in which persuasion typically operated – in the court, from the rostra, in the senate or council chamber

– and the sensitivity of the human face and body as media of passionate expression, you would have ample opportunity to confirm the appropriateness of your response merely by remarking the faces and the postures of your peers. In this way the successful speaker produced in his audience the shared sense that they were both ‘right-thinkers’ *and* ‘right-feelers’: evoking passions in speech served as a way not only of confirming judgements but of creating a community compounded jointly of reason and sentiment.

Consider, for example, the peroration of Cicero’s speech of 80 BC defending Sex. Roscius of Ameria against the charge of patricide, in the case often credited with making Cicero’s early reputation. It is Cicero’s strategy throughout not only to argue that Roscius could not have committed the crime, and to shift the blame on to plausible others, but especially to implicate the former dictator Sulla’s henchman, the freedman Chrysogonus, who (we are to believe) schemed to frame Roscius in order to acquire his property. In the peroration (143–54) Cicero draws these threads together by presenting the judges with contrasting images of the defenceless Roscius and his powerful tormentor. He begins by asserting that his entire oration has had three motive forces (143): the common good (*res publica*), the wrong done by ‘those awful people’ (*istorum iniuria*), and his own *dolor* – the psychic pain that is the common element of several ‘negative’ emotions. Cicero will make us feel this pain too, as he invites us – in part explicitly, in part by implication – to entertain at least four specific passions.

Two of these passions are immediate and complementary. Roscius, not only innocent but assailed and defenceless (*nudus*: 144, 150), is deserving of *miseri-cordia*. That would be obvious even if his advocate did not cue us explicitly by using the word three separate times (145, 150, 154) or twice adopt the first-person singular to speak in Roscius’ character (145, 150), thereby making the plea more vivid and reminding us that the ability to see oneself in the other’s suffering is at the core of pity. Just as obviously, Chrysogonus merits indignation. He is vastly more powerful than his victim, he is using his power beyond the law and against the common good to gain his personal ends, and he is doing all this with cold-blooded cruelty (*crudelitas*), attacking someone for whom he feels neither the hatred (*odium*) nor the fear (*metus*) that might explain the attack (146–7). The two passions, and the perceptions that Cicero creates to stir them, are of course mutually entailing and reinforcing: if we feel indignation for one who causes another undeserved suffering, we will feel pity for the victim, and if we feel pity for the victim of undeserved suffering, we will feel indignation for the person who caused it.

Or rather, we *ought* to feel these complementary passions. And to ensure that we do, Cicero brings into play two other complementary passions – pride and shame – that depend on our seeing ourselves as being perceived in creditable or discreditable terms. Accepting Cicero’s framing of the issues, and sharing in his pity and indignation, confirms our ‘goodness’ as individuals and as members of the community (150 *unum perfugium, iudices, una spes reliqua est Sex. Roscio*

*eadem quae rei publicae, vestra pristina bonitas et misericordia*: ‘Sextus Roscius has only one refuge remaining, the same as the state itself has, your undiminished virtue and pity’), whereas failure to see things in Cicero’s terms, and therefore to feel the pain he feels, would simply be shameful: in that respect, pride and shame function here as second-order passions, experience of which depends on our sharing or failing to share the first two passions that Cicero seeks to arouse. The only alternative that Cicero leaves us is to align ourselves with Chrysogonus in his cruelty and to see ourselves being seen as accomplices in his crimes – and again, this would be perfectly plain even if Cicero did not make it explicit (150 *sin ea crudelitas . . . vestros quoque animos . . . duriores acerbioresque reddit, actum est, indices*: ‘but if that cruelty makes your minds, too, harder and harsher, it is all over, men of the jury’).

The young Cicero’s evocation of the passions here is not without its power, and it is evident how the orator gains by forming a community of sentiment around his cause. To gain its ends in persuasion, oratory both stirs the passions of its audience and represents the experience of passion in others (Cicero, e.g., must manifest his own pain and indignation and cause the judges to ‘see’ all the sadness suffered by Roscius). In this respect oratory is no different from imaginative literature in the effects it seeks to achieve. To those effects we can now turn.

#### 4 The Passions in Roman Imaginative Literature

We can start with ‘pure’ representation, and a text in which the author wishes us clearly to see – but not to share – a character’s passion. The *Aeneid*, like the *Iliad*, begins with anger, though not the protagonist’s (that, most famously, comes at the end), as Vergil presents us with the multidimensional and richly imagined *ira* of Juno: ‘I sing of arms and the man . . . much buffeted on land and sea . . . on account of the mindful anger of fierce Juno’ (*saevae memorem Iunonis ob iram*):

Muse, bring to my mind the reasons – her godhead harmed,  
 the thing that caused her pain: why did the queen of the gods make  
 a man of signal devotion unfurl so many misfortunes? . . .  
 Do the minds of the heaven-dwellers know such anger?  
 There was an ancient city (colonists from Tyre possessed it),  
 Carthage . . . ,  
 which Juno (it’s said) cherished beyond all lands . . . :  
 that this place hold sway over the nations (should the fates  
 allow) was even then the goddess’ warm intent.  
 But there was a line descended from Trojan blood (she had heard)  
 that would one day overturn the Tyrians’ citadel; from this line  
 would come a people, wide-ruling and proud in war,  
 to bring destruction to Africa: so the Fates spun the skein.



In fear of this, and mindful of the old war that she first and foremost had waged at Troy for dear Argos' sake – indeed not yet had the causes of her anger and her fierce pain slipped from her mind, in her thought there stayed deep-set the judgement of Paris and the wrong done her spurned beauty and the hateful race and the honours paid to ravished Ganymede: inflamed by all this too she kept the Trojans, the leavings of the Greeks and of ungentle Achilles, tossed over all the sea, far away from Latium.

(*Aeneid* 1.7–32)

The narrator names the passion, then asks its causes (*causas*): the question assumes that her anger is about something, and that the 'aboutness' comprises some injury done to her (*numine laeso*) and some pain she feels (*quidve dolens*). The muse (we must assume) gives a careful reply, for in a scrupulous sequence we learn that Juno comes to her anger from a certain disposition, her favour for Carthage and her attachment to it (15–18); that a perception supervenes upon this disposition, knowledge of the fact (for it is 'fated') that the city she favours will come to harm (19–22); and that her value-laden disposition, combined with this perception, prompts a prospective passion, fear of the harm to come (23–4).

But here Vergil's imagining takes its most perceptive turn: for one painful passion, the *fear of future harm* implicating the Trojans, is represented as leading immediately to the *memory of past harm* involving the same people. Even the syntax ruptures at this point, as though to suggest the wave of sudden memory that breaks over the goddess: what flashes through the next few lines is simply what flashes through her thoughts as she relives the hurts. In quick order we are given:

- (a) the *causes* (25–6), whose cognitive character is emphasized by repeated reference to Juno's mind (*animus, mens*), and
- (b) the concomitant *feelings*, her 'pains' (*dolores*);
- (c) an elaboration of the *causes* (26–8), in a catalog of the wrong (*iniuria*) done to her through the judgement of Paris, with its tincture of shame (the thought of her 'beauty spurned'), through Zeus' infidelity with Electra (condensed in reference to the 'hateful race' thereby engendered through Dardanus, first lord of Troy), and through the 'honour' paid by Zeus to the fair boy Ganymede (whose *honores* contrast with the *inuria* suffered by Juno); and
- (d) the *response* (29–31), comprising both Juno's embodied feeling (the 'heat of anger': *accensa*) and her acts of vengeance.

We can understand Juno's passion – her *ira*, with its prelude in fear and its overlay of shame – intimately and fully, because Vergil has meticulously represented it to us. We can even understand, by implication, how the passion that has cognitively

'reasonable' causes will have completely unreasonable consequences; for her passion will cause Juno to try to keep the Trojans from Italy, even though she knows that their establishment in Italy, and the eventual destruction of Carthage, are destined and unalterable. But however much we are meant to understand Juno's passion, we are surely not meant to feel it ourselves.

Nor, I think, are we meant to feel any other passion of our own in response to Juno's wrath, save perhaps a touch of pity for the sea-tossed Trojans: Vergil at this point aims primarily to make us see how the divine *ira* sets the story in motion, and so aims just to represent it as clearly as he can. For an example of the opposite effect – a passion that is meant to be evoked in the reader though it is not quite represented in the text – we can turn to a very different kind of text, and a passion more subtle than rage.

In his 'Love-Cures' (*Remedia amoris*) Ovid adopts the character of the 'teacher of love' first assumed in the *Ars amatoria*, though now with the opposite intent (see Gibson, chapter 11 above). Among the strategies he recommends is a set of 'aversion-therapies' meant to make you regard your beloved with one form of revulsion or another: for example, by forcing yourself to see her as often as possible, you will soon come to feel *taedium* – the sense of 'having had it up to here' (cf. 537–42). One of these therapies involves the feeling expressed by the verb *piget* – an especially interesting case because it denotes a passion that in its full-blown form corresponds to no single English label. When you experience *pig-* (as we can put it, to preserve the strangeness), you feel an overwhelming lassitude of body and mind, the sense that any further action would be too much (this feeling predominates in the cognate adjective and noun *piger/pigritia* = 'sluggish(ness), lazy(-ness)'). This feeling, furthermore, is accompanied by a certain cognitive orientation toward your present state: a repugnance for where you find yourself and a regret for the actions that brought you there.

With these elements of the passion in mind, then, consider the blunt (and deeply misogynistic) use to which the 'teacher' puts them as he sketches a bout of love-making:

Then too I bid you open wide the windows and  
 in the full flood of light remark the base body-parts.  
 But as soon as your pleasure has reached its goal and come to an end,  
 when body and mind are drained and drooping –  
 while you feel *pig-* and would rather not have touched any girl,  
 and think you won't touch one again for a good long while –  
 then carefully catalogue all her blemishes  
 and keep your eyes fixed on her flaws.

(*Remedia Amoris*, 411–18)

The 'teacher' is obviously trading on the associations that can be formed between various forms of sight-induced aversion (cf. 429–32) and post-coital tristesse, in

the expectation that the former will reinforce the latter to produce a lasting repugnance. Two other points, perhaps less obvious, are worth drawing out. First, we can appreciate the way in which Ovid neatly suggests both the psychosomatic and the cognitive components of the passion by lodging the statement of the feeling ('while you feel *pig*': *dum piget*) between, on the one hand, the lassitude of body and mind (414 'when body and mind are drained and drooping') and, on the other, the judgements and evaluations associated with regret (415–16 'and would rather not have touched any girl / and think you won't touch one again for a good long while'). The second point is this: the evocation of *pig* is meant to be evocative in fact, to arouse in the reader at least some of the same feeling. The 'teacher' assumes that the reader has known *pig* not just in general terms but in these circumstances: the insinuating second-person singular guarantees this, and the very fact that 'you' are looking for a cure for love means that you have 'been there'. And so you are encouraged to think, 'Oh Lord, I know just what you mean.' To persuade you that this therapy will work, the teacher invites you to slip into the feeling again and try it on for size.

Now consider a final example of the passions put to work in literature, a text in which both representation and evocation are balanced with great beauty. It is the point at which, near the end of *Aeneid* 10, the renegade tyrant Mezentius is about to meet his deserved end, as he withdraws wounded before Aeneas' onslaught – but before Aeneas can close for the death blow Mezentius' devoted son, Lausus, enters the frame, weeping:

He groaned heavily (*ingemuit graviter*), out of love for his dear begetter,  
did Lausus when he saw, and tears rolled down his cheeks.

(*Aeneid* 10.789–90)

At the same time the narrator too steps forward, as he does when other splendid youths die (cf. 9. 446–9; 10. 501–9), now to foreshadow what we know must happen:

Here the calamity of harsh (*acerbae*) death and your excellent (*optima*) deeds . . .

I for my part shall not pass in silence, no, nor you, o memorable (*memorande*) youth.

(*Aeneid* 10.791–3)

The epithets – 'harsh', 'excellent', 'memorable' – guide our judgement, prompting us to view Lausus' acts as noble and his death as undeserved, as he slips between his father and his attacker, holding the latter off long enough to allow the former to withdraw. Then the end:

Aeneas bears up under the storm of war . . . , taunting Lausus,  
threatening Lausus: 'Why do you rush to your death, daring things

beyond your strength? Your devotion (*pietas*) makes you careless and leads you astray.' Still Lausus leaps about in a frenzy (*exsultat demens*), and now feelings of fierce anger (*saevae irae*) mount higher in the Trojan leader: the Fates pluck the final strands of Lausus' life.

(*Aeneid* 10.809–15)

So Lausus dies in an ecstasy of mad aggression brought on by love and rage. Aeneas too feels great anger; yet in the midst of that anger is an awareness of virtue – *fallit te incantum pietas tua* – that both corroborates the judgement the narrator has already provided and prepares us for what happens next:

But as he saw the expression on his face as he died,  
his face as it turned uncanny pale, the son of Anchises  
groaned heavily (*ingemuit graviter*), taking pity (*miserans*), and held out  
his right hand, and there stole upon his mind an image of a son's devotion  
for his father: 'What now, pitiable youth, will *pius* Aeneas give you to balance  
the praise you are due, what worthy of so noble a character?'

(*Aeneid* 10.821–6)

Aeneas' groan of pity (823) balances Lausus' earlier groan of love (789) to round the episode off; and by this point Vergil has done everything within his power to insure that we understand – and share – these groans. Not only has the narrator intervened in his own voice to mould our judgements; not only has Aeneas reinforced those judgements by expressly acknowledging Lausus' virtue, even at the peak of his fury; but because the moment of Lausus' death is presented through Aeneas' eyes ('But as he saw...'), we see only what he sees and, more important, we see it *as* he sees it, *Anchisiades*, 'the son of Anchises' himself once greatly devoted to his father, in whose mind the image of *pietas* is still alive and who can accordingly see himself in the dying youth before him. Not to share this pity would require a detachment so austere as to place the reader outside the community of sentiment that the text works to create. But then, the poet might ask, why bother to read at all?

To be sure, being swept up in literature's passions is not without its dangers, as readers from Plato to St Augustine, and beyond, have pointed out. But reading with an eye to the passions – with an understanding of their basis and the means used to represent and evoke them – is one of the most useful tools for grasping the play of values, virtues, and vices that makes literature most like life. And insofar as reading with understanding is itself an enjoyment, keeping an alert eye on the passions can be said to be one of the chief pleasures of the text.

## FURTHER READING

The passions (or 'emotions': for present purposes the terms can be regarded as synonymous) have been much studied in the past twenty-five years, in a range of academic disciplines: Lewis and Haviland-Jones (2000) is a useful starting point, offering essays in several broad categories (e.g., 'Interdisciplinary Foundations', 'Social Processes Related to Emotion', 'Select Emotions'), with each essay supplemented by an up-to-date bibliography. Other valuable general studies, with varied conceptual frameworks, include Solomon (1976), Rorty (1980), Harré (1986), Shweder (1991), Ekman and Davidson (1994), Damasio (1995), Elster (1999), Katz (1999), Ben Ze'ev (2000), Nussbaum (2001); on the cognitive basis of the passions emphasized in this essay, especially useful are Lyons (1980), Taylor (1985), Gordon (1987), De Sousa (1987), Ortony et al. (1988).

The cognitivist approach has ancient roots, and it is therefore not surprising that much useful recent work has been done on the passions in ancient psychology and philosophy, including Fortenbaugh (1975), Frede (1986), Annas (1989), Brunschwig and Nussbaum (1993), Nussbaum (1994), Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (1998), Cooper (1999), Sorabji (2000). Several studies of specific passions in their ancient social and cultural context have also recently appeared, again with varied conceptual frameworks: see especially Cairns (1993) and Barton (2001) on 'shame' and 'honour' in (respectively) Greece and Rome; Barton (1993) on 'despair' and 'envy'; Harris (2001) on 'anger'; Konstan (2001) on 'pity'; Kaster (2001) on 'disgust'; Toohey (2004) on 'melancholy'. Wisse (1989) rigorously discusses the place of the passions in rhetorical theory from Aristotle to Cicero, and Fortenbaugh (1988) comments helpfully on the latter in particular; Graver (2002) is an excellent guide to Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* 3–4, the most important overview of the passions in Latin. Finally, the contributors to Braund and Gill (1997) offer a far richer array of studies on the passions in, specifically, Roman literature than this brief essay has been able even to suggest.