


PHOENIX



Plate 4. Lucius Aelius Commodus Verus (British Museum)

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INVIDIA AND THE END OF *GEORGICS* 1

ROBERT A. KASTER

IN 1946 THE PSYCHOLOGIST D. O. HEBB REPORTED AN EXPERIMENT conducted at the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology in Georgia.¹ The Yerkes staff had been used to treating the chimpanzees anthropomorphically, attributing to them distinct and consistent personalities and emotional dispositions: so Pati was said to hate human beings, for example, while Bimba was friendly but quick-tempered. The staff relied on these attributions in caring for and working with the animals, because they appeared to have a predictive value. Pati's supposed hatred for humans made handlers wary of her sneak attacks, whereas the staff could expect that the irascible yet basically friendly Bimba would attack with the straightforwardness of candid anger; and these attributions in fact proved to be "intelligible and practical guides" to the animals' behavior. The experiment, by contrast, consisted of "a thoroughgoing attempt to avoid anthropomorphic description in the study of temperament": for two years the staff were rigorously to avoid intuitive reading of the chimps' feelings, to avoid drawing any connection between feelings and behavior, and instead to compile only records of actual behavior, with a view to obtaining "an objective statement of the differences from animal to animal." It proved to be a long two years: for from this attempt to avoid attributing emotions to the chimps, "all that resulted was an almost endless series of specific acts in which no order or meaning could be found." The chimps' behavior became literally unintelligible, as though they were human psychopaths whose actions lacked any stable reference point—and handling them became quite dangerous indeed.

Now this experiment probably does not prove that chimps actually *have* emotions, as we would recognize them in each other. But it does provide a vivid reminder of how much we humans depend on reading emotions in constructing orderly patterns of meaning in our daily lives. Such patterns depend on, among other things, understanding causation, on constructing for our own lives a plausible narrative that correlates ends and means, causes and effects. My relations with others depend on managing the ways in which the narrative I construct for

An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Charles Alexander Robinson Jr Memorial Lecture at Brown University in April 2001 and also at Princeton University, the University of Chicago, and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York: I am grateful to the audiences on all these occasions for their helpful responses, and to Denis Feeney, Fritz Graf, Josiah Osgood, Richard Thomas, and Peter White for reassurance at a still earlier stage that my view of *Georgics* 1 was not just eccentric. Finally, my sincere thanks go to James Rives and the referees of *Phoenix*. All translations in the text are my own.

¹Hebb 1946 (quotations in the text from 88). My attention was first drawn to Hebb's paper by Gordon (1987: 1-4).

myself intersects with the narratives I can plausibly construct for them; and in that intersection much depends on assessing the others' temperaments, to make reasonable inferences and predictions about the judgments that they will make and the behavior that will follow.

These are just the practical hermeneutics of daily life, and they are inevitably mirrored in the hermeneutics of reading. Making sense of any narrative depends on making similar attributions of temperament, assessments of motive, judgments of appropriateness: just think of the end of the *Aeneid* and the vast debate prompted by Aeneas' anger in a situation where the attribution of the emotion and its object—what his *ira* is about—seem tolerably clear, but where judgments of appropriateness have differed radically. We are uneasy as readers when we cannot confidently ascribe plausible emotional states to the person, or persona, there before us, or when we cannot understand the emotion's basis: it is as disconcerting as coming face to face in the street with a passer-by gripped by some strong but unidentifiable feeling, or by an obvious but inexplicable fear.

I recently experienced uneasiness of this sort on reading again a text that I had read scores of times before and really trying, for the first time, to understand its emotional content. The text is the interchange between Meliboeus and Tityrus at the start of the first *Eclogue* (1–12):

Mel. *Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi
silvestrem tenui Musam meditaris avena;
nos patriae finis et dulcia linquimus arva.
nos patriam fugimus; tu, Tityre, lentus in umbra
5 formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas.*

Tit. *O Meliboee, deus nobis haec otia fecit.
namque erit ille mihi semper deus, illius aram
saepe tener nostris ab ovilibus imbuet agnus.
ille meas errare boves, ut cernis, et ipsum
10 ludere quae vellem calamo permisit agresti.*

Mel. *Non equidem invideo, miror magis: undique totis
usque adeo turbatur agris.*

Mel. There you lie, Tityrus, beneath the spreading beech's shade,
rehearsing your woodland Muse on slender pipes,
while I leave behind my homeland's bounds, its sweet fields.
I go in flight from the land; you, Tityrus, in the shade lazily
5 teach the woods to echo fair Amaryllis' name.

Tit. Oh Meliboeus, it's a god made this peace and quiet for me.
For he will always be a god for me, that one, and often will
a tender lamb from my pens stain his altar with its blood.
He's the one granted my cattle leave to roam, as you see, and
allowed me to play what I please on my rustic reed.

Mel. I for my part don't feel *invidia*, rather surprise: such utter confusion
reigns in every field, all around.

For the most part, the text talks explicitly only of what the two are doing now, or what has been done in the past; much of the most important communication proceeds obliquely and, I suggest, indeterminately. On the surface, Meliboeus merely remarks the difference between his condition and Tityrus', and says enough to show that he regards his condition as less desirable, more painful in emotional terms: thus the repeated reference to his flight from his *patria* and the pathetic epithet *dulcia*, as opposed to the repeated reference to Tityrus' ease, *recubans sub tegmine fagi . . . lentus in umbra*. By contrast, the reason he remarks the difference, the point he wishes to make, is left entirely implied.

Does he make his observation in the spirit of an "objective reporter" ("There you are, here I am, and that's the way it is")? Or does he mean to register surprise and seek an explanation ("Gee whiz, how come you're here and I'm here . . .?")? Or does he mean to register envious indignation and seek a justification ("Hey, where do you get off . . .?")? Or is there yet another nuance? And how does Meliboeus take the remarks? His report of the god's action is evidently offered by way of explanation, but in what spirit? Is it just an expression of gratitude, straightforward and even naive in its enthusiasm, an instance of "tactless exultation" that shows us a Tityrus so caught up in his own good cheer as to be careless of Meliboeus' distress?² Or does he mean to respond to that distress by trying, in effect, to trump it with the god's favor? Is his report meant to meet an implied reproach in Meliboeus' remarks by letting him know that the difference in their conditions is due to no bad acts on his own part? Or does he seek to put Meliboeus in the wrong by suggesting that he is merely being envious when he should (for example) be glad? And when Meliboeus says that he feels not *invidia* but surprise, does he say this because he realizes his initial comments could be misread? Or because he realizes that they were in fact misread? And when he denies feeling *invidia*, what exactly is he denying?

In response to all this, I think two things can be said: we cannot fully understand the exchange without knowing the answers to all these questions; and the answers to all these questions cannot be known. It is perhaps disquieting to find the Vergilian corpus opening with a representation of such thorough-going emotional opacity.

Still: whatever else can be said, Meliboeus' emotions are clearly *about* something. They depend on judgments, beliefs, desires. They imply a story that could be told, even if it is told here more allusively than explicitly. In principle, therefore, his emotions are intelligible. It is my aim in this paper to consider how we make such emotional representations intelligible; I start from the fact that they imply an "aboutness," an account that can be given. First, I will give a general account of the emotion that Meliboeus denies feeling, *invidia*. Then I will apply some implications of this account to a pivotal passage in the *Georgics* that I believe has not been well understood, because an emotion central to it has not been well understood.

² So, e.g., Coleman 1977: 75 (on line 11).

If you consult the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* on the “meaning” of *invidia*, you will find first an etymology rightly deriving the word from the adjective *invidus*, itself formed from the compound verb *invidere*, “to look against”: that is, “to look at in a hostile manner or with hostile intent”—in other words, the territory of dark looks and the Evil Eye.³ You will then find a menu of English glosses organized primarily, if tacitly, according to a distinction between “active” *invidia*—the “ill will, spite, indignation, jealousy, [or] envy” that we feel toward some person or object or state of affairs—and “passive” *invidia*—the “odium” or “dislike” directed against us.⁴ In offering these glosses the *OLD* is doing the job that lexica are supposed to do, and I have no serious quarrel with it, in the sense that most instances of the Latin label *invidia* can be intelligibly “translated” by one or another English label that the *OLD* offers.

But a label is not a meaning, and a lexicon is not the language. A lexicon’s approach to the language of emotions generally leaves unanswered a host of crucial questions; and what is true of emotion terms in general is certainly true of *invidia*. For example, what exactly is the relation among labels such as “dislike” and “envy” and “spite”? Is it merely contingent? Is it just the case that if you “envy” someone (as we would put it) you will probably “dislike” him as well, or that if you “dislike” someone you will probably be inclined to “spite” him as well? But what causes us to feel any of these things to begin with? Why do you “look against” this person or thing, and not another? What range of persons or things can provoke that look? And why are all these English labels bundled together under the single Latin label, *invidia*?

To begin to answer these questions I can make the obvious point that all emotion terms, in any language, are at base just convenient devices for sorting experiences that share a general surface likeness. In Latin, for example, the *amor* of sexual partners and the *amor* of family members converge on a cluster of thoughts and feelings—having to do with “attachment,” “concern,” and the like—that are sufficiently similar to motivate the use of the same label. But of course sexual *amor* is also different from familial *amor*, and that difference depends in large part on the different intentional states of the people experiencing the emotions—their different judgments, beliefs, and desires. Such intentional states, in turn, are embedded in narratives—sequences of cause and effect, of perception,

evaluation, and response—that can conveniently be called “scripts.” It is in terms of such scripts that the language of emotion can be most fully understood; and understanding the language of emotion in this way necessarily stresses its specifically cultural content. The workings of the autonomic nervous system that cause us to grow faint with “fear” or flush with “anger” may be constants in our biology, but the judgments and beliefs that prompt these workings vary significantly from one human culture to another.⁵

So—in the case of *invidia*—what script or scripts does a Roman experiencing *invidia* enact, what are the evaluations essential to the emotion, and what is their cultural content? To start to answer these questions, we can consider the partial taxonomy of scripts represented in Figure 1. The taxonomy is only partial, in the sense that it could be extended “downward” in further ramifications, omitted here primarily because they are not relevant to the main arguments to come.⁶ I would also stress that the taxonomy was not constructed *a priori*: I did not sit down and decide what a plausible taxonomy might look like, then sort the textual instances accordingly. The taxonomy was built inductively: these are just the consistent patterns that emerge from reading, at least a couple of times each, every passage in classical Latin in which *invidia*, *invidere*, and their cognates occur, while asking this question: what are the common threads in the stories that are told under the cover of *invidia*?⁷

At the most general level, all the stories share a perception—that another person is enjoying some good—and a response that includes an unpleasant “feeling” of some sort (*dolor*, *aegritudo*, vel sim.): these traits are hardly surprising, because they are the very traits that the Romans themselves picked out when they defined or otherwise reflected on the emotion.⁸ At the next level, however, the most important narrative distinction is not the distinction between “active” and “passive” found in the lexica—between feeling *invidia* and being its object—but whether or not the story must be told with reference to some principle of right or fairness or the like: whether or not it is a “moral” story, in short.

So on the left side of the taxonomy (scripts 1 and 2), I feel *invidia*—I have an unpleasant psychosomatic experience when I see your good—not with reference to some principle of justice, but just because it is a *good*, or just because it is *your*

³For development of this point, in connection with the concept of *fastidium*, see Kaster 2001.


⁶For example, each script can be enacted either “in fact” or, so to speak, “proleptically”: in the case of script 1, I can feel *dolor* at, and so “begrudge” you, a good that you in fact already possess, just because it is a good (I can want to wipe that smile off your face just because it is a smile), or I can feel *dolor* at, and so “begrudge” you, a good that you might come to possess (I can deny you a drink of water when you are thirsty just because it would quench your thirst). Note also that the scripts are *not mutually exclusive*: it is quite possible, in fact common, to enact two or more of them simultaneously with reference to the same person or state of affairs.

⁷Particularly since the *TLL* articles give only a sampling of the evidence, I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by the Packard Humanities Institute CD-ROM #5.3 (1991) in tracing the uses of *invidia* and its cognates.

⁸For *invidia* described as *dolor* or *aegritudo* caused by another’s advantage or success, see, e.g., Cic. *De or.* 2.209, *Tusc.* 3.20, 4.16–17; similarly Ovid *Met.* 2.780–782; Sen. *Dial.* 6.19.6, 11.9.3–9.

³This and the next several paragraphs, with Figure 1, are abbreviated and adapted from Kaster 2003, a longer account of *invidia* and its “scripts.” The lexicography of *invidia* and its cognates tends to discuss the Latin in terms of one or another lexical “equivalent” in the modern European languages (“envy,” “Neid,” etc.), a limited and limiting approach: see esp. Odelstierna 1949 for a study of emotion-language running off the rails when conducted solely at the level of lexical “equivalents.”

⁴The distinction between “active” and “passive” that the *OLD* leaves implied is explicit in the very similar analysis at *TLL* 7.2: 199.19–206.14 s.v. *invidia* (K. Stiewe): “I. passive: invidia ea, qua premimur ab aliis invidentibus: sive i. q. livor sive i. q. indignatio, offensio sim., quae notiones saepe seiungi non possunt A. in universum . . . B. peculiariter . . . II. active: invidia ea, qua ipsi aliis invidemus: sive i. q. invidentia (quae notio sub hoc tit. praevalet) sive i. q. indignatio, offensio sim.” (*sc. in alios*). For lexicographical approaches to the *invidia*-family, see also Wistrand 1946; Stiewe 1959; Schapp 1962; Weische 1966: 92–102.

Figure 1. "Scripts" of *invidia*: A Partial Taxonomy

[†] This is the side on which fall both *invidia virtutis* and the topos that *invidia* "strikes the summits" (just because they are summits): this is "malice," *invidia* as *livor*.

[‡] We could also distinguish scripts 3 and 4 by saying that the former always concerns a violation of distributive justice that is explicitly self-referential, whereas the latter is neither (explicitly) self-referential nor as limited in the kinds of "right" it invokes (see, e.g., Cic. *Ine.* 1.22 [cf. *ad Herenn.* 1.8] on arousing *invidia* against others *si vis eorum, potentia, divitiarum, cognatio proferentur atque eorum usus arrogans et intolerabilis, ut his rebus magis videantur quam causae suae confidere*, similarly Quint. 4.1.14 and 6.1.14).

good. I suggest in Figure 1 a characteristic thought that could be expressed by someone acting out each script, and a thought that actually is expressed by the most fully rounded representative of such scripts in English literature, Iago, who responds quite distinctly to the virtue of Desdemona (because it is virtue) and to the happiness of Othello (because it is Othello's).⁹ I take it that these scripts of *invidia* will seem familiar and need no elaborate illustration:¹⁰ scripts 1 and 2 both shape, for example, Ovid's extended personification of *Invidia* at *Metamorphoses* 2.760–832, and one or the other of them appears in a pair of well-known passages from *Aeneid* 4 that we can consider briefly.

As he sends Mercury to give Aeneas the order to sail, Jupiter expresses his general displeasure at the hero's failure to keep his shoulder to the wheel (Verg. *Aen.* 4.227–231):

*non illum nobis genetrix pulcherrima talem
promisit Graiumque ideo bis vindicat armis;
sed fore qui gravidam imperiis belloque frementem
Italiam regeret, genus alto a sanguine Teucri
proderet, ac totum sub leges mitteret orbem.*

Not that sort did his fair, fair mother tell us he was,
and on strength of that twice snatch him from Greek arms;
no, he'd be the sort to rule Italy (she said), a land pregnant
with power, rumbling with war, and bring forth a line
from Teucer's lofty blood, and make all the world submit to law.

The father of gods and men then caps his complaint with the question (232–234):

*si nulla accendit tantarum gloria rerum
nec super ipse sua molitur laude laborem,
Ascanione pater Romanas invidet arces?*

If glory bought by such great deeds does not kindle him,
and if he sets no massive toil in train for his own name's sake,
Does he as father feel *invidia* for Ascanius over Rome's citadels?

Which is to say: "Does the father feel *dolor* at the thought of his son's good?" The question presumes that the father does not want the good for himself, for he

⁹ Script 2 can further ramify, not only according to the distinction between "actual" and "proleptic" goods already remarked (above, n. 6), but also according to the degree of self-referentiality entailed: I can feel *dolor* at seeing your good just because it is your good, period, or I can feel that way because the good is yours and not mine (i.e., a distinction between a merely begrudging thought, as we might put it in English, and a thought that is both begrudging and covetous at the same time). The self-referential version of script 2 *invidia* resembles our "envy" of mere differential status, as a feeling that can be assuaged either by your losing the good in question or by my gaining the same (or equivalent) good: this is "core" envy, with no moral content: cf. Rawls 1971: 533–534; Taylor 1988.

¹⁰ These scripts of *invidia*-as-*livor* are most relevant to the iconography of φθόνος / *invidia* discussed in the excellent survey of Dunbabin and Dickie (1983), and are at the center of discussion in Barton 1993: 107–175.

has abandoned *tantarum gloria rerum*: no, he merely begrudges his son that good, as we would say, because it is a good, or because it would be Ascanius' good (or conceivably both). In either case such feelings would of course be wicked, and that is why Jupiter says it: he wants to put Aeneas in the wrong, and so he casts him in a role that has no moral basis.

It is with some irony then—for of course Aeneas does not hear Jupiter's reproach—that Aeneas takes precisely the same tack barely 100 lines later, in the speech that finds him at his rhetorical low ebb in the poem, when he tries to cast Dido in a similarly wicked role (347–350):

*si te Karthaginis arces
Phoenissam Libyaeque aspectus detinet urbis,
quae tandem Ausonia Teucros considerare terra
invidia est? et nos fas extera quaerere regna.*

If the heights of Carthage and the sights
of a Libyan settlement keep you, a Phoenician, rapt here,
why in the world is it a matter of *invidia* that Trojans settle
in the Land of the West? It's fair that we, too, seek alien realms.

The form of the expression here is different—the idiom *quae invidia est* is equivalent to *cur invidet*, “why do you feel *invidia*” at a given state of affairs—but the thought is the same. Dido (Aeneas alleges) wants to deny the Trojans the good in question, yet she has no interest in it herself—in fact, she already has an equivalent good of her own. She can therefore have no defensible reason for feeling *invidia* for the Trojans: she must want to deny them the good because it is a good, or because it would be theirs (or conceivably both). In any case—acting out either script—she would be acting without reference to any principle of justice.

On the right side of the taxonomy, by contrast, I feel *invidia* at your good only with reference to some sense of “right.” It may be a sense of right that is self-regarding, and therefore potentially self-serving (script 3): the characteristic thought here is that the good you enjoy is rightfully mine (this is the script that Iago acts out in relation to Cassio). For an example, recall here another passage from Vergil, the archery contest in the funeral games for Anchises in *Aeneid* 5 (485–542). Aeneas has tethered a bird to a mast and promised top prize to the archer who strikes the fluttering creature. First one archer hits the mast, then another severs the tether, then Eurytion brings the bird to earth with his arrow; but still king Acestes shoots, and his arrow miraculously catches fire in mid-air and is consumed. Recognizing a portent when he sees one, Aeneas awards top prize to Acestes, and the narrator comments (541–542):

*nec bonus Eurytion praelato invidit honori,
quamvis solus avem caelo deiecit ab alto.*

Nor did good Eurytion feel *invidia* for the “preferred honor,”
though he alone had brought the bird down from lofty heaven.

That good Eurytion did not *praelato invidit honori* is a Vergilian way of saying that he did not feel *invidia* for Acestes, who had been *praelatus*, given precedence, in honor. The comment is added because in ordinary circumstances Eurytion would have felt *invidia*, and indeed would have been justified in that feeling, for a prize that was rightfully his by the rules of the game had been given to another: that is the point of the final clause. But Eurytion is *bonus* here precisely because he can see that these are not ordinary circumstances and hence willingly forgo his right.

The remaining script—in fact the single most common *invidia*-script, and that by some distance—is one in which I am moved by a sense of “right” that has no explicit reference to self at all. Rather, my *dolor* here derives from seeing you gain or use some good—wealth, prestige, authority, or the like—in a way that affronts some general societal principle: you have behaved (or are behaving, or are about to behave) high-handedly, cruelly, self-indulgently, or against the common good, and you damn well ought be ashamed of yourself.¹¹

This script's link with shameful behavior is strong and clear as far back as we can trace the concept *invidia*. I will offer just a few illustrations, starting with our earliest example of continuous Latin prose, the preface to Cato's *De agricultura*, in which he famously compares farming with trade and money-lending (pr. 1–4):¹²

Est<0> interdum praestare mercaturis rem quaerere, nisi tam periculosum sit, et item fenerari, si tam honestum sit. maiores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt: furem dupli condemnari, feneratorum quadrupli . . . mercatorem autem strenuum studiosumque rei quaerendae existimo, verum, ut supra dixi, periculosum et calamitosum. at ex agricolis et viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi gignuntur, maximeque pius quaestus stabilissimusque consequitur minimeque invidiosus minimeque male cogitantes sunt qui in eo studio occupati sunt.

Granted, it's sometimes preferable to seek wealth through trade—save that it's so risky—and similarly by putting money out at interest—if it could be as honorable. Here's what our ancestors thought, and established in law: that a thief is fined twofold, but a money-lender fourfold . . . Now a trader I judge to be a vigorous sort and dead keen on making money, but, as I said, vulnerable to risk and liable to disaster. But it's from amongst farmers that the bravest men and most vigorous soldiers arise and the most righteous and reliable income derives, and the sort least liable to *invidia*, and the people engaged in this pursuit are least of all given to wicked scheming.

So in a nutshell, Cato says, trade is insufficiently secure, while money-lending is insufficiently honorable. Farming, by contrast, avoids the insecurity inherent in trade and the *invidia* that clings to money-lending—the feeling that those who engage in it are in fact worse than thieves, that like thieves they are violating a social norm and should be ashamed of themselves. Because this script of *invidia*

¹¹The argument that this script of *invidia* is Latin's counterpart to νέμεσις, forming with *pudor* the same sort of “reflexive pair” that νέμεσις does with αἰδώς, is developed more fully in the paper cited above, n. 3.

¹²On the text, reading *est<0>*, see most recently Courtney 1999: 50.

responds to gaining or using an advantage in a way judged socially destructive and discreditable, it appears in contexts as varied as the forms of socially destructive and discreditable behavior itself. Some other examples, very briefly:

- Defending Caelius, Cicero says that he will not ask that the indulgence owed to youth be extended to his client: no, no, it may be that other members of the *jeunesse dorée* lead lives of self-indulgence, going into debt, surrendering to *petulantia* and *libidines*, and thereby incurring the *magna invidia* owed to *vitia* and *peccata*—but *not* his blameless client!¹³
- Speaking of himself, Cicero returns repeatedly during the last twenty years of his life to the *invidia* directed at him as a result of his role in suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy, a role in which—on this view—he exercised his authority high-handedly and against the interest of the *res publica*.¹⁴
- In structurally identical circumstances, the dictator Cornelius Cossus suffers *invidia* for imprisoning the seditious Manlius Capitolinus in 385 B.C.E.: as Livy tells the story, the triumph over the Volsci that Cossus celebrated at the same time as Manlius' imprisonment was read by much of the plebs as symbolic not of his glorious victory over a *hostis* but of his arrogant and shameful abuse of power in dealing with a *civis*.¹⁵
- Finally, and returning to Vergil, we know the speech of shamed self-awareness that Mezentius is made to speak as he mourns Lausus' death at the end of *Aeneid* 10.¹⁶ He berates himself not only for allowing his son to die in his stead, but also for having in the first place “stained” the boy's name, his honor, by his own bad acts, *pulsus ob invidiam solio sceptrisque paternis*—the *invidia* in question being that felt by the subjects whom he cruelly abused. Had his subjects' *invidia* caused Mezentius to feel then the shame that he feels now, he would not now have to feel the shame he feels; but of course had Mezentius

¹³Cic. *Cael.* 30: *itaque ego severitati tuae ita ut oportet respondere non audeo. erat enim meum deprecari vacationem adulescentiae veniamque petere. non, inquam, audeo; per fugiis nihil utor aetatis, concessa omnibus iura dimitto; tantum peto ut, si qua est invidia communis hoc tempore aeris alieni, petulantiae, libidinum iuventutis, quam video esse magnam, tamen ne huic aliena peccata, ne aetatis ac temporum vitia noceant.*

¹⁴Cic. *Cat.* 1.22: *tametsi video, si mea voce perterritus ire in exilium animum induxeris, quanta tempestas invidiae nobis, si minus in praesens tempus recenti memoria scelerum tuorum, at in posteritatem impendat, cf. Cat. 1.28–29, 2.3, 15, 3.3, 28–29, Sull. 9, 33, Dom. 44, Har. Resp. 61, Pis. 72, Mil. 82, Phil. 3.18, Leg. 3.26; similarly Sall. BC 22.3, 43.1; Suet. Jul. 14.1.*

¹⁵Livy 6.16.4–5: *coniecto in carcerem Manlio satis constat magnam partem plebis vestem mutasse, multos mortales capillum ac barbam promisisse, observatamque vestibulo carceris maestam turbam. dictator de Volscis triumphavit, invidiaeque magis triumphus quam gloriae fuit; quippe domi non militiae partum eum actumque de cive non de hoste fremebant: unum defuisse tantum superbiae, quod non M. Manlius ante currum sit ductus.*

¹⁶Verg. *Aen.* 10.846–852: *tantane me tenuit vivendi, nate, voluptas, / ut pro me hostili paterer succedere dextrae, / quem genui? tuane haec genitor per vulnera servor / morte tua vivens? heu, nunc misero mihi demum / exitium infelix, nunc alte vulnus adactum! / idem ego, nate, tuum maculavi crimine nomen, / pulsus ob invidiam solio sceptrisque paternis.*

then been capable of feeling such shame, he would not have behaved in a way that provoked his subjects' *invidia*.¹⁷

Now reading the texts with a thought for these scripts produces in general, I think, a more nuanced understanding, if only because it compels us to pause to consider exactly what sort of human response any given passage seeks to represent. For that matter, what sort of divine response, too—for the gods, as we know, have the same emotions as humans, only bigger. To illustrate this point, and to illustrate the utility of this way of reading, I will in the balance of this paper try to persuade you that one of the best-known passages in Vergil has been consistently misread because an emotion central to it has been misunderstood.

The passage occurs at the horrific conclusion to *Georgics* 1.¹⁸ Consideration of the sun's prognostic displays has led the speaker to recall the many signs that surrounded the death of Julius Caesar, when (as he says) the “impious generations of men were in terror of eternal night” (468: *impia . . . aeternam timuerunt saecula noctem*). This memory of dreadful omens in turn leads to thoughts of civil war, and of Roman strength bleeding away time and again on the plains of northern Greece (489–492):

*ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis
Romanas acies iterum videre Philippi;
nec fuit indignum superis bis sanguine nostro
Emathiam et latos Haemi pinguescere campos.*

And so once more Philippi has seen Romans in combat dash themselves against themselves, their powers matched; the Ones Above thought it fine that Emathia and Haemus' broad plains twice grow gorged and fat with our blood.

And so—before concluding with an image of the world swept away by a war running wildly out of control (509–514)—the speaker offers an urgent prayer (498–508, with the standard punctuation in modern editions):

¹⁷Cf. *Aen.* 11.539–540, on the Mezentius-like figure of Metabus, father of Camilla, *pulsus ob invidiam regno virisque superbas*. Note that Servius gets the nuance more or less right in the latter case (*PVLVSVS OB INVIDIAM scilicet crudelitatis; nam sequitur [568] “neque ipse manus feritate dedisset”*), while in the case of Mezentius—whose attack of conscience Servius doggedly refuses to recognize—he says *PVLVSVS OB INVIDIAM excusat, ne merito expulsus esse videatur*, evidently understanding a form of *invidia* corresponding to what I have called script 1 or script 2: Servius supposes that the phrase *ob invidiam* is meant to remove the moral burden from the object of *invidia* and place it by implication on the *invidentes*, who (on this view) behaved unjustly.

¹⁸I take the range of contemporary responses to this passage to be represented by the following: Buchheit 1966; Klingner 1967: 219–223; Wilkinson 1969: 148–149, 159–162; Buchheit 1972: 31–38; Putnam 1979: 72–76; Miles 1980: 104–108; Seaton 1983: 50–56; Thomas 1988: 151–154; Perkell 1989: 150–152; Mynors 1990: 96–99; Cramer 1998: 64–68. Since the reading I propose diverges, in general and in most particulars, from all the foregoing, it would at best be tedious for the reader if I were to annotate all the divergences: I have mostly limited specific references to acknowledgments of debts.

di patrii Indigetes et Romule Vestaque mater,
 quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia servas,
 500 hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo
 ne prohibete. satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
 Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae;
 iam pridem nobis caeli te regia, Caesar,
 invidet atque hominum queritur curare triumphos,
 505 quippe ubi fas versum atque nefas: tot bella per orbem,
 tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro
 dignus honos, squalent abductis arva colonis,
 et curvae rigidum falces conflantur in ensem.

Ancestral Gods, heroes of the land, and Romulus, and you,
 mother Vesta, who watch over Tuscan Tiber and Roman Palatine,
 500 at least do not stop this young man from bringing aid to a world
 overturned. Enough long since have we paid in blood
 for the treachery of Laomedon's Troy; long since
 has heaven's court been feeling *invidia* against us over you,
 Caesar, complaining that you care for triumphs of men,
 505 understandably, seeing that right and wrong are reversed: so many wars
 throughout the world, so many forms of crime, the plow has
 no worthy honor, fields go to seed, abandoned by their tillers,
 and from curved pruning hooks is forged the hard sword-shaft.

The prayer is crucial to the tone of the ending, and to the claim being made
 for Caesar; and central to the prayer (503–504) is an attribution of *invidia*: *iam
 pridem nobis caeli te regia, Caesar, / invidet*. So a fair amount should ride on
 understanding just what this *invidia* is.

For some time now, Caesar, the “palace of heaven” has been feeling *invidia*
 against us—us mortals, as *hominum* soon makes plain—with respect to you. Or
 as we might say, “For some time now, Caesar, the palace of heaven has been
 begrudging you to us”: you are a good, the *caeli regia* wishes to deny us this good,
 and it has been so disposed for quite a while. Now this *invidia* is not, first of
 all, the so-called “envy of the gods,” or φθόνος τῶν θεῶν, that we know chiefly
 from late archaic and classical Greece, where the gods—of Aeschylus or Pindar or
 Herodotus—often feel φθόνος for an Eastern potentate or a Greek tyrant because
 he seeks or threatens to surpass the lot of the merely mortal and rival the gods
 themselves.¹⁹ Rather, the expression initially seems to align itself with the thought
 that appears most commonly in Latin when *invidia* is attributed to the gods: it
 is assumed that the gods just wish to deny us a good, either because it is a good
 or because they just do not want us to have it.²⁰ This is the thought that appears

¹⁹ See, e.g., Walcot 1978: 46–49; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 69–70; Bulman 1992: 32–34 (differently, Rakoczy 1996: 247–270).

²⁰ That is, script 1 or script 2 *invidia*, the sort of “malice” comparable to *livor* or βλασφημία: gods at, e.g., *Carm. epigr.* 54.2–3 (aet. Sull.: *matrem non licitum es<se uni>ca gnata frui, quam nei esset, credo,*

most often in connection with cases of untimely death and with expressions of
 mourning and consolation: in the grip of this thought, aggrieved mortals act out
 their pain by convicting the gods of malicious *invidia*, and that at first sight seems
 to be the case here.²¹

But then a second predicate fills out the thought in an unexpected way, with
 implications that make this meditation on divine *invidia* all but unique in Latin
 literature. The palace of heaven feels this *invidia* and “complains that you care
 about the triumphs of men.” *hominum* is pointed, and shows the thrust of the
 celestial thought, as the *caeli regia* seeks to claim Caesar for itself.²² The thought
 is plainly not that the gods feel jealous ill will for Caesar as a would-be rival to
 their power (as in the φθόνος τῶν θεῶν), nor that they simply begrudge Caesar to
 “us,” as an exercise in malice. Rather the court of heaven covets Caesar for itself:
 because the denizens of the *regia* think that he properly belongs with them, they
 complain that he carries by concerning himself with mortal triumphs. Under this
 conception of the *invidia deorum*, the gods feel pain at seeing “us” have a good that
 they regard as rightfully theirs (cf. script 3); and it is this particular conception of
 divine *invidia* that is nearly unique. I have found it elsewhere only in the *Hercules
 Oetaeus* ascribed to Seneca, of Jupiter's *invidia* for Amphitryon and his wish to
 claim Hercules as his own (1510–12):

*mortali tamen
 caelum tenens invidit, Alciden suum
 dici esse voluit*

And yet heaven's lord
 felt *invidia* for a mortal, wished that the “scion of
 Alceus” be called his own.

I assume that this passage looks directly back to the Vergilian, as the poet seeks
 the right thought with which to frame another heroic figure caught between two
 worlds.

This instance of divine coveting of course resumes a motif already found near
 the beginning of the book, the anticipated apotheosis of Caesar; but here the
 motif has a very different tone and coloring. In lines 24–42 Vergil exuberantly,
 even playfully, scouts the idea that Caesar will soon (*mox*) have the opportunity
 to choose which divine realm he will make his own:

nesci>quis in>veidit deus); Prop. 1.12.7–9; Vell. Pat. 1.10.4; Lucan 4.243–245, 9.64–66; Sil. *Pun.*
 4.397–400, 12.236–238, 14.580–584; Val. Flacc. 2.375–377, 3.306–308; Florus 1.7 (divine *invidia*
 denied at Ov. *Am.* 3.10.5–6; Val. Max. 2.6.7; Sen. *Ben.* 2.28.1–29.6; Tac. *Germ.* 33.1); *fatum* or *fata*
 at, e.g., Ov. *Pont.* 2.8.57–60; Sen. *Apoc.* 3.2; Lucan 1.70–72; Phaedrus 5.6; Pliny *NH* 35.92 (cf.
 35.156); Martial 9.76.6–8, 10.53, 12.14.7–8; Stat. *Theb.* 10.384–385; *Silv.* 2.1.120–122; ps.-Quint.
Decl. Mai. 8.10.

²¹ So, e.g., Buchheit 1966: 79–80; cf. Buchheit 1972: 37–38 (in an exceptionally thoughtful reading of the passage).

²² Cf. the *Brevis expositio ad loc.*: *INVIDET quod hic sis in terra, non (in) caelo cum diis.*

25 *tuque adeo, quem mox quae sint habitura deorum*
concilia incertum est, urbisne invisere, Caesar,
terrarumque velis curam, . . .
an deus immensi venias maris ac tua nautae
30 *numina sola colant . . . ;*
anne novum tardis sidus te mensibus addas . . . ;
quidquid eris (nam te nec sperant Tartara regem . . .),
40 *da facilem cursum atque audacibus adnue coeptis,*
ignarosque viae mecum miseratus agrestis
ingredere et votis iam nunc adsuesce vocari.

You too hail, Caesar, whom gatherings of gods will soon embrace
25 —but which? Will you wish to make the rounds of cities ♣
and assume the care of lands, . . .
or will you make your way as a god of the measureless sea
30 to whose divinity sailors pay cult . . . ?
Or will you add a new constellation to the sluggish months (of summer) . . . ?
Whatever you will be (for surely Tartarus does not await your rule . . .),
40 grant me an easy journey, favor my bold beginnings,
and—joining me in pity for peasants ignorant of the way—begin
even now to find familiar the sound of your name invoked in vows.

But now at the book's end *mox* has been replaced by the insistent *iam pridem*; instead of an anticipated future we have the nagging past; it seems that Caesar is not the one who will choose the opportunity; and Caesar's translation, when it comes, will seal our mortal doom, for he is our only possible salvation. This covetous *invidia* of the *caeli regia* suffuses the passage with dread. To consider how it does so, we should look a little more closely at the divine complaint.

Now *queritur*, like *invidet*, is a focalizing verb. It purports to give us the *regia*'s point of view, its take on things; and that take is plainly filtered here through the strong emotion that animates the *regia*, its *invidia*: the *regia* complains because it covets. This should warn us against simply granting the status of objective truth to the complaint's substance, for it is only an interested interpretation of Caesar's intentions, actions, and affect: Caesar may or may not care for mortal triumphs, but the heavenly complaint gives no ground for judging—that is just the way things look to the *regia*, or how it chooses to present them as it presses what it regards as its rightful claim.

Just how partial that point of view is can be seen if we ask what actions it interprets: when the court of heaven complains, what is it complaining about? The context allows only one answer. What the *regia* sees as Caesar's "concern for triumphs" is what the speaker himself has just characterized in very different terms at line 500, *everso . . . succurrere saeclo*:²³ where the speaker sees an apparently selfless attempt to aid a ruined world, the *regia* sees—or anyway cares to present—only Caesar's ambitious pursuit of trifles in a realm where he does not truly belong.

²³The connection is made, e.g., by Cramer (1998: 65).

No, Caesar belongs in the *regia*, and so it serves heaven's rhetorical purpose to present in the worst possible light any action that keeps Caesar among men. The complaint is thus sharply opposed to the speaker's point of view, and deeply hostile to humanity, insofar as it implies that the palace of heaven does not care a whit about the mortal *saeculum*. But that is exactly what we should expect, given the structure of the passage to this point.

Consider together lines 498–504. First, the prayer to the "ancestral gods," the *di patrii*, and the native heroes of the land, the *Indigetes*, with the latter represented by Romulus, the former by Vesta: at least do not keep this youth from bringing aid to a *saeculum* overturned.²⁴ Next come two clauses presented in parallel by the repeated phrase *iam pridem*: with our blood we have long since paid enough (or, if *luimus* is present, we have long been paying enough: the crucial word in either case is *satis*) for the perjuries of Laomedon's Troy, for a long time now heaven's court has been feeling *invidia* against us because of you, Caesar, and has been complaining that you care for mortal triumphs. The two clauses are often read separately, but the repeated *iam pridem* demands that they be taken together, as bearing on the same point; and it is one of Roger Mynors's several important contributions to this passage that he makes explicit what this point is: "what holds [the clauses] together is that they present two reasons why action now is urgent: (1) it is overdue; (2) at any moment we may lose the one person who might succeed."²⁵ Or to put it another way, because the clauses give the reason why the gods addressed should heed the prayer, there should be a colon (not a period) after *prohibete* and a comma (not a semicolon) after *Troiae*.²⁶

500 *di patrii Indigetes et Romule Vestaque mater,*
quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia servas,
hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo
ne prohibete: satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
Laomedontea luimus periuria Troiae,
iam pridem nobis caeli te regia, Caesar,
invidet atque hominum queritur curare triumphos

500 Ancestral Gods, heroes of the land, and Romulus, and you,
mother Vesta, who watch over Tuscan Tiber and Roman Palatine,
at least do not stop this young man from bringing aid to a world
overturned: enough long since have we paid in blood
for the treachery of Laomedon's Troy; long since

²⁴I set aside, as not relevant to my main argument, the question what *saltem* modifies: see the alternatives surveyed by Mynors 1990: 96 (*ad loc.*). I prefer to read *di patrii* and *Indigites* as distinct (with Thomas 1988: 151; differently, Mynors 1990: 96), though this too has no material bearing on my argument.

²⁵Mynors 1990: 97.

²⁶This implication of Mynors's point is grasped by Cramer (1998: 65); but because he reads heaven's *invidia* only allegorically (as a "euphemistic" expression of fear that Octavian will be killed in battle before ending the war), he does not push the matter farther (see below).

has heaven's court been feeling *invidia* against us over you,
Caesar, complaining that you care for triumphs of men

Furthermore, the pronouns show how we are to visualize this setting of vivid prayer, as we move from the deixis of *hunc . . . iuvenem*—the youth imagined as on hand right here, while the speaker addresses the gods—to the direct address of *te*. The speaker turns from one party (the *di patrii*) to the other (the *iuvenis*) in the same speech circumstance: the one clause (*satis iam pridem*) is spoken as though directly to the *di patrii* but in Caesar's hearing, the other (*iam pridem nobis te*) spoken as though directly to Octavian in the hearing of the *di patrii*, with both clauses giving a basis for the prayer, the reasons why it should be granted now.

There is, however, something very important about this sequence of thought that has not been noticed before. The prayer to the *di patrii* is urgent in part because, as Mynors puts it, "we may lose the one person who might succeed": but we face that danger precisely because of the *invidia* of the *caeli regia*. It seems that in thinking about this passage we should avoid the usual habit of referring without distinction to "the gods"; for evidently prayer is being made to one set of gods to anticipate a danger posed by another. On the one side, the gods of the Roman home and of Roman history, who protect the river that nurtured Rome's greatness and the hill on which by tradition it was founded: Romulus, the founder king and hero, to whom Octavian is here implicitly assimilated;²⁷ Vesta, the spirit-flame of home and hearth, handed over to Aeneas with *lares* and *penates* as Troy fell (cf. *Aen.* 2.296). On the other side, the gods of the heavenly court, the conventional, Olympian pantheon: Apollo and Neptune, whom Laomedon defrauded, setting in train the cycle of crime and compensation that his heirs are still repeating; the great gods, whose battle over Troy was revealed to Aeneas' mortal vision by his mother as he brought the household divinities out of the doomed city (cf. *Aen.* 2.604–618); the gods not near at hand but far above, the *superi*, who just previously were said to be well pleased by the repeated spilling of Roman blood (491: *nec fuit indignum superis*).²⁸ And between these contrasting sets, between the native gods close at hand and the remote, self-interested court of heaven, is the *iuvenis*, Caesar, capable yet vulnerable. The prayer's core, *ne prohibete*, implies that he has both the will and the ability to bring aid to the *saeculum*; and indeed that very ability implies that he somehow stands outside the topsy-turvy *saeculum*, that he is in but not wholly of this ruined generation of men, that he has some stable standpoint which gives him the leverage to make things right. But precisely because he has this extraordinary standing the *caeli regia* feels that it can rightfully

²⁷ See especially Buchheit 1972: 34–35.

²⁸ The contrast has been noted before, in different terms: e.g., Miles 1980: 107 ("In his prayer for deliverance . . . he ignores Jupiter, the divine father of the Stoic cosmos, and turns instead to the more intimate divinities of the Roman people"); Mynors 1990: 96 ("The gods of Greece and of poetry are swept aside by intense feeling, and the Roman poet appeals to the deities most intimately concerned with Rome itself").

make its claim and its complaint. The very attributes that suit Caesar to his role as savior also move the heavenly *regia* to claim him as its own, and so make him vulnerable to the version of divine *invidia* imagined here. Hence the urgency of the speaker's prayer.²⁹

One further detail hinges on this refined understanding of heaven's *invidia*: the relevance of the following remarks, introduced by *quippe ubi* in 505. As usually punctuated, the phrase marks a subordinate adverbial clause (*ubi*), with *quippe* indicating that the speaker accepts the foregoing proposition as self-evidently valid: the nuance is "naturally so/understandably so, for . . ." ³⁰ But what, precisely, is "understandable"? Or in syntactic terms, what does the adverbial clause modify: *queritur* or *curare*? Richard Thomas—uniquely, so far as I know—chooses the latter, taking the thought to elaborate Caesar's *cura*: in Thomas's paraphrase, the gods "complain . . . that you care for triumphs among mortals [which you are compelled to do], inasmuch as right and wrong are inverted among them." On this reading, the clause replies to heaven's complaint, as the speaker in effect justifies Caesar's *cura*: he does not pursue triumphs eagerly or even willingly, out of mere lust for glory—as the *regia*'s "invidious" complaint seems to imply—but because the ruined state of the world demands that (as Thomas glosses *curare*) he "have a concern for [military action which will set the world right and result in] triumphs."³¹

Now this view has some difficulties, chief among them the fact that much of the thought on which it most depends has no counterpart in the Latin text: in particular, the notion that triumphs would be a mere by-product, not the true object, of Caesar's *cura*, and the highly colored plea that Caesar is "compelled" to care for triumphs, would both be important, non-obvious elements of the speaker's argument that Vergil just did not bother to make plain. Yet though I do not think it is the best possible approach, Thomas's reading certainly has the merit of acknowledging, by implication, that the alternative, standard reading is far more problematic still: that reading construes *quippe* closely with *queritur*; and that construction in turn makes the speaker of the prayer complicit in the heavenly court's *invidia*. "Long since," the speaker says, "the court of heaven has been feeling *invidia* against us over you, Caesar, and has been complaining . . . understandably . . ." No: the speaker cannot find the gods' complaint "understandable" or self-evidently valid, because that means accepting the peevish and invidious terms in which the complaint is cast and the characterization of Caesar's actions and motivations as focalized through a covetous *caeli regia*, not as a selfless attempt to rescue a world overturned—as the speaker puts it earlier

²⁹ As Chris Faraone remarked to me in conversation, to the extent that Octavian here is assimilated to Romulus, the passage entails a meditation on two forms of godhood—the deified local hero as tutelary power versus the distinctly chilly "global" divinity of the Olympians—and a preference (at least in the circumstances) for the former.

³⁰ So rightly Mynors 1990: 61 (*ad* 1.268).

³¹ Thomas 1988: 152–153.

in the prayer—but as a pursuit of mortal—and so, trifling—triumphs. If the speaker aligns himself with the complaint, he aligns himself with the emotion that inspires it, which is to say, with the emotion hostile to the speaker's own interests. He makes a hash of his own prayer.

There is, however, another alternative:

500 *di patrii Indigetes et Romule Vestaque mater,
quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia servas,
hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo
ne prohibete: satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae,
iam pridem nobis caeli te regia, Caesar,
invidet atque hominum queritur curare triumphos!*
505 *quippe, ubi fas versum atque nefas, tot bella per orbem,
tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro
dignus honos, squalent abductis arva colonis,
et curvae rigidum falces conflantur in ense.*

500 Ancestral Gods, heroes of the land, and Romulus, and you,
mother Vesta, who watch over Tuscan Tiber and Roman Palatine,
at least do not stop this young man from bringing aid to a world
overturned: enough long since have we paid in blood
for the treachery of Laomedon's Troy; long since
has heaven's court been feeling *invidia* against us over you,
Caesar, complaining that you care for triumphs of men!
505 For indeed, when right and wrong are reversed, when there are so many wars
throughout the world, when there are so many forms of crime, the plow has
no worthy honor, fields go to seed, abandoned by their tillers,
and from curved pruning hooks is forged the hard sword-shaft.

The speaker prays (498–501) and adduces, as justification for the prayer, two facts that have long since, *iam pridem*, been true (501–504). Period. (Or, perhaps better, exclamation mark!) He then offers a thought that extends the prayer and confirms its righteous urgency, taking us through the remaining ten lines of the book. *fas versum atque nefas* resumes *everso . . . saeclo* from line 500, but now the general idea of a world overturned is developed to show us the full horror of, specifically, the georgic world in ruin: ancestral gods, at least do not hinder this young man as he tries to aid the ruined world, “for indeed—when right and wrong are reversed, when there are so many wars throughout the world, when there are so many forms of crime—the plow has no worthy honor, fields go to seed, and pruning hooks are made into swords.” *quippe* plus a tricolon, framing *ubi* plus a tricolon, forcefully introduces a consideration that should further move the ancestral gods by drawing their attention to a present truth: because of war the land that ought to be their special concern is suffering neglect and deterioration.³²

³² My particular thanks to David Konstan for very helpful prodding on this point.

The phrasing, with *quippe* introducing an emphatic assertion in the main clause in collocation with circumstantial *ubi*, is of course very common in Lucretius, who was much on Vergil's mind in the *Georgics*.³³

Getting heaven's *invidia* right—if that is what we now have done—has some significant consequences. First, and in contrast to some other contemporary readings, it offers what seems to be an unambiguously favorable and hopeful view of Caesar, who is raised above the *saeculum* that he will save if only he is allowed by a covetous heaven. Second, this reading tends to throw much more of the moral burden for human suffering on the powers of heaven. If “we”—mortals, Romans—have long since paid enough for our ancestors' wrongs, then plainly it is unjust that we are being made to pay more; and insofar as we will be made to pay still more if heaven's *invidia* robs us of a savior, then heaven's *invidia* is fully implicated in the injustice. It seems noteworthy that whereas we began this capstone passage with impious generations of men, *impia saecula*, fearing eternal night in 468, we close with an impious god, *Mars impius*, running amok in 511. So far has the rhetoric of the passage carried us in the space of forty lines.

Perhaps too far for the taste of Horace, whose second poem in the first book of *Odes* is famously in dialogue with this passage of the *Georgics*.³⁴ *Iam satis* at the ode's start (1–4: *Iam satis terris nivis atque dirae / grandinis misit pater et rubente / dextera sacras iaculatus arces / terruit urbem*) recalls *satis iam* of *Georgics* 1.501; again there are the Tiber and Vesta (13–16: *vidimus flavum Tiberim retortis / litore Etrusco violenter undis / ire deiectum monumenta regis / templaque Vestae*, and especially 26–28: *prece qua fatigent / virgines sanctae minus audientem / carmina Vestam?*) and fear for the *ruens imperium* (25–26: *quem vocet divum populus ruentis / imperi rebus?*); and at the poem's end Caesar again appears as savior (49–52: *hic magnos potius triumphos [sic!], / hic ames dici pater atque princeps, / neu sinas Medos equitare inultos / te duce, Caesar*). Caesar's premature removal to heaven, too, is again imagined as a possibility (45–49), but now with a difference. This time the translation would result not from the *invidia* of heaven but from Caesar's own revulsion against our human wickedness: *neve te nostris vitis iniquum ocior aura tollat*, “let not a breeze too swift take you off, hostile to our vices” (47–49). The moral burden has shifted squarely onto our shoulders, and Horace wants nothing to do with the *invidia* of heaven's *regia*: indeed, it is pointedly the gods of the Olympian pantheon who are canvassed as possible saviors in lines 29–44, first Apollo, then Venus, then Mars, before the speaker settles on Mercury, the divine go-between, as the god whom we are to recognize in Caesar's mortal form.

³³ E.g., Lucr. 4.664–667: *quippe, ubi cui febris bili superante coorta est / aut alia ratione aliquast vis excita morbi, / perturbatur ibi iam totum corpus et omnes / commutantur ibi positurae principiorum . . .*; 4.771–772: *quippe, ubi prima perit alioque est altera nata / inde statu, prior hic gestum mutasse videtur . . .*; 4.925–928: *quippe, ubi nulla latens animai pars remaneret / in membris, cinere ut multa latet obrutus ignis, / unde reconflari sensus per membra repente / posset, ut ex igni caeco consurgere flamma?*

³⁴ See, e.g., Fraenkel 1957: 242–251; Nisbet and Hubbard 1970: 16–21.

If this is correct, then the distance between the end of *Georgics* 1 and *Odes* 1.2 allows us to trace an important step in the development of the Augustan ideology of vice and salvation.³⁵ But that is the subject for a different essay.

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³⁵On this see the stimulating essay of Wallace-Hadrill (1982).

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