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INVIDIA, ΝΕΜΕΣΙΣ, ΦΘΟΝΟΣ, AND THE ROMAN EMOTIONAL ECONOMY

Robert A. Kaster

Writing to Atticus from Cilicia in September of 51 BC, Cicero responds as follows to the news that an enemy of his, M. Calidius, had recently met defeat in the consular elections:¹ 'It is a great sign of affection to say that you are glad about the defeat of your sister's son's uncle's rival. Indeed, it prompts me to rejoice too – which hadn't occurred to me. You don't believe me? Just as you like; but frankly I do rejoice, since feeling νέμεσις is different from feeling φθόνος.' Cicero writes here in the relaxed and playful, even arch, manner that he often adopts with Atticus. One token of the manner is the reference to Atticus's sister's son's uncle, who of course is Cicero himself: the periphrasis, probably first tossed off as a *jeu d'esprit* by Atticus, is here appreciatively lobbed back to its author. Another token is Cicero's semi-slipping into Greek at the end, where he alludes to the sort of distinction that Aristotle draws in the *Rhetoric* between νέμεσις and φθόνος; the difference between feeling pain at another's unmerited success and feeling pain at another's success, not because it is unmerited, but because the other is our *peccr*.² This is the distinction approximated in Shackleton Bailey's translation of Cicero's

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1 Cic. *Att.* 5. 19. 3 (translation adapted from Shackleton Bailey): quod scribis libente te repulsam tulisse eum qui cum sororis tuae filii patruo certaret, magni amoris signum. Itaque me etiam admonuisti ut gauderem; nam mihi in mentem non venerat: non credo inquis. Ut libet; sed plane gaudeo, quoniam tò νεμεσάν interest τοῦ φθονεῖν.

2 Arist. *Rhet.* 2.9 (1386b8–20): Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὁ καλοῦσι νεμεσάν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενον ἐστὶ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἠθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις . . . δόξαιε δ' ἄν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον. ὡς συνέγυος ὦν καὶ τῶν τῷ νεμεσάν, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον· λυπῆ μὲν γὰρ παραφώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίτου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὀμοίου.

semi-Greek, 'since malice is one thing, righteous indignation another': to be glad that Calidius failed just because he is Calidius would be malicious, a case of φθόσος; to be glad that he failed because he did not deserve to succeed is a sign of healthy character.

The nod to Greek ethics is, as I said, part of Cicero's manner in the letter, both playful (Cicero demonstrates, tongue-in-cheek, that he is ethically 'sound') and a reminder that their shared culture is one of the bonds between friends. Perhaps, though, Cicero's use of the Greek here is not just mannered, but a means of achieving clarity as well. For if we ask how Cicero would have expressed the same idea in Latin had he used the most commonly deployed terms that correspond to the Greek ethical concepts, the answer is clear – or rather, not clear at all: for he would have said 'plane gaudeo, quoniam invidia ab invidia interest' – 'since *invidia* is one thing, *invidia* another', or simply '*invidia* is different from *invidia*'. So much, at any rate, is the burden of my surface argument in this chapter: the Romans defined their emotional terrain in such a way that the one label, *invidia*, did the work of two quite distinct labels in Greek. That is the more trivial point of the phrase 'emotional economy' in my chapter title: the tight-fisted Romans were so economical emotionally that they used one label for two seemingly distinct kinds of affect! The more important point of the phrase, however, is connected with my deeper argument, which has nothing to do with such lexical equivalents or labels. The argument is this: first, that the only sound way to understand the emotional language of any culture, our own included, is in terms not of lexical meaning but of 'scripts' – the narratives that we all enact when we experience any emotion; second, that it is the way a given culture's scripts interact that reveals the structure and dynamics of the culture's emotions – the ways in which emotional energy is expressed, understood, and harnessed to do various kinds of cultural work.

I will develop and, I hope, clarify these contentions; but first some background on the semantics of *invidia* – familiar ground, I am sure, but necessary to cover in order to make plain where my argument comes from. If you check *invidia* in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, you will find an account that rightly derives the word from the adjective *invidus*, which is in turn formed from the compound verb *invidere*, roughly 'to look against':³ that is, not just 'to look at' (which would be the non-existent compound **ad-videre*), but 'to look at in a hostile manner or with hostile intent' – the difference is comparable, for example, to the distinction

3 *OLD*: **invidia** -ae, f. [INVIDUS + -IA]. 1 Ill will, spite, indignation; jealousy, envy. [-*TLL* 11, see n. 5 below]. . . . 2 (particularly as affecting the object of the feeling) Odium, dislike. . . . [-*TLL* 1.A] 3 (aroused against an opponent, as a way of contributing to his defeat). **b** the use of words or actions to arouse this feeling. [-*TLL* 1.B].

between *ad-videre* 'to carry to or toward' and *in-videre* 'to carry against', that is, 'attack'. In other words, we are in the territory of dark looks and the Evil Eye.⁴ The *OLD* organizes this territory primarily according to an implied distinction between 'active' *invidia* – the 'ill will, spite, indignation, jealousy, [or] envy' that we feel toward some person or object or state of affairs – and 'passive' *invidia* – the 'odium' or 'dislike' directed against us; and what the *OLD* leaves implied is explicit in the very similar analysis of the *Thesaurus*.⁵ (Parenthetically, both *OLD* and *TLL* distinguish a third, more specialised sense of *invidia* – a 'rhetorical' or 'forensic' sense – used of the sentiment aroused against an opponent: I believe that it is historically misleading to regard this sense as a distinct aspect of the term, but the point will not affect my argument.)⁶

Now in general I think that both lexica are doing the job that lexica are supposed to do, and I have no serious quarrel with them. In distinguishing the so-called passive and active usages, they reflect the Romans' understanding of one feature of the word's usage, a feature that even led to the coinage of the term *invidentia* to express the 'active' feeling, so that the ambiguity could be avoided.⁷ And the lexica provide a decent range of glosses, in the sense that most occurrences of the Latin label *invidia* can be intelligibly 'translated' by one or another of the English labels that the *OLD* offers.

But a label is not a meaning, and a lexicon is not the language. A lexicon's approach to the language of emotions generally leaves unanswered a host of crucial questions; and what is true of emotion terms in general is certainly true of *invidia*. For example, what exactly is the relation between labels such as 'dislike' and 'envy' and 'spite'? Is it merely

4 Jahn 1855 is the classic discussion of the 'Evil Eye', and see now Rakoczy 1996.
5 *TLL* 7.2: 199.19–206.14 s.v. *invidia* (K. Stiewe): **I. passive**: invidia ea, qua premimur ab aliis invidentibus: sive i. q. livor sive i. q. indignatio, offensio sim., quae notiones saepe setungi non possunt **A.** in universum **B.** peculiariter, praecipue in sermone forensi et rhetorico: invidia petitur adversario sive dictis sive actionibus. . . . **II. active**: invidia ea, qua ipsi aliis invidemus: sive i. q. invidentia (quae notio sub hoc tit. praevalet) sive i. q. indignatio, offensio sim. (sc. in alios). For lexicographical approaches to the *invidia*-family, see also Stiewe 1959; Schaupp 1962; Weische 1966: 92–102; and the next note.

6 Both lexica have been influenced here by the excellent discussion of Wistrand 1946, to which I am also much indebted; the broad criticisms of Wistrand developed by Odelstierna 1949 are rightly rejected in *TLL* (indeed, Odelstierna offers a signal instance of how the study of emotion language, when conducted solely at the level of lexical 'equivalents', can run off the rails). Yet in suggesting that this adversarial sense arose as a specialised usage of forensic rhetoric and only then percolated through other domains of Roman language and life, Wistrand seems to have got the direction of influence just the wrong way around.

7 See Cic. *TD* 3.20: si sapiens in aegritudinem incidere posset, posset etiam in misericordiam, posset in invidentiam. non dixi 'invidiam,' quae tum est cum invidetur; ab invidendo autem invidentia recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ambiguum nomen invidiae; and cf. *TLL* 7.2:1 90.39–191.15 s.v. *invidentia*.

contingent? Is it just the case that if you 'envy' someone (as we would put it) you will probably 'dislike' him as well, or that if you 'dislike' someone you will probably be inclined to 'spite' him as well? (Presumably the *TLL* means something like this when it says 'livor sive . . . indignatio, offensio sim., quae notiones saepe se iungi non possunt'.) But what causes us to feel any of these things to begin with? *Why* do you 'look against' this person or thing, and not another? What range of persons or things can provoke that look? And why are all these *English* labels bundled together under the single Latin label, *invidia*?

I will begin to answer these questions by making the obvious point that all emotion terms, in any language, are no more than convenient devices for sorting experiences that share a general surface likeness: in Latin, for example, the *amor* of sexual partners and the *amor* of family members converge on a cluster of thoughts and feelings – having to do with 'attachment', 'concern', and the like – that are sufficiently similar to motivate the use of the same label. But of course sexual *amor* is also different from familial *amor*, and that difference depends in large part on the different intentional states of the people experiencing the emotions – their different judgements, beliefs and desires. Such intentional states, in turn, are embedded in narratives – sequences of cause and effect, of perception, evaluation and response – that can conveniently be called 'scripts'. Only in terms of such scripts can the language of emotion be understood.⁸

Hearing Joe make a comment to Jack [perception], you *believe* the comment was made about you and *judge* it a slur [evaluation]. At once, a *desire* to retaliate explodes in your mind, your *chest* 'tightens', your *face* 'flushes', your *eyes* seem to 'swim', your *pulse* and *breathing rates* increase, you *feel* 'tense' or 'agitated', and you *formulate* some comment while *advancing* upon Joe, as your *hands* ball into fists and your *lips* part slightly to reveal your *teeth*: your response combines abnormal states in your body (breathing, pulse) and your affect (tension, agitation) with behaviours that are pragmatic (formulating a comment) or expressive (baring your teeth) or potentially both (your aggressive movement and balled fists). If you are tracking your emotions, you will register the playing out of this process by thinking some version of 'Oh my, I'm *really* angry now!'; and you will typically connect this thought – and the label 'anger' – with the last stage of the process, the response, and with your feeling a certain way or displaying a certain behaviour. The 'emotion' rightly so-

8 For earlier development of this point, in connection with the concept of *fastidium*, see Kaster 2001. The 'universal semantic metalanguage' elaborated by Wierzbicka 1992, as a means to approach the cross-cultural discussion of emotion terms, is comparable to the notion of 'scripts' applied here; there are significant differences as well, which should be worth examining on another occasion.

called, however, is the whole process and all its constituent elements, experienced as a whole: your 'anger' can be understood only as the little drama that body and mind enact together from beginning to end. Subtract any element of the drama, and the emotion does not exist: without the response, there is only dispassionate evaluation of discourse; without the evaluation, there is a mere 'seizure' of mind and body that is *about* nothing at all.⁹

Stressing the script as a whole in this way lets us give due weight not only to the response – the usual focus when talk turns to emotions – but also to the evaluation; and giving evaluation its due is important in at least two ways. First, it draws into discussion the cognitive aspects of emotion – the involvement of belief and judgement – which often have been separated from or contrasted with emotion. (Granted, the importance of cognition to emotion will be more familiar to students of Aristotle than to those whose views have been shaped, willy-nilly, by René Descartes or William James or B. F. Skinner.) Second, stressing the evaluation necessarily stresses the specifically cultural content of emotion: the behaviour of the autonomic nervous system may be a constant in human biology, but the judgements and beliefs that prompt such behaviour are highly variable from one human culture to another.

So – to return to *invidia* – what script or scripts does a Roman experiencing *invidia* enact, what are the evaluations essential to the emotion, and what is their cultural content? To start to answer these questions, we can consider the partial taxonomy of scripts that appears as Figure 12.1. I stress that this taxonomy was not constructed *a priori*: I did not sit down and decide what a plausible taxonomy might look like, then try to sort the textual instances accordingly. The taxonomy was built inductively: these are just the consistent patterns that emerge from reading, at least a couple of times each, every passage in classical Latin in which *invidia*, *invidere* and their cognates occur and asking this question: what are the common threads in the stories that are told under the cover of *invidia*?¹⁰

At the most general level, all the stories share a perception that another person is enjoying some good – and an unpleasant 'feeling' of some sort (*dolor*, *aegritudo*, *vel sim.*); these traits are hardly surprising, because they are the very traits that the Romans themselves picked out

9 This holistic approach to understanding emotion is well emphasised, in different terms, by e.g. Schweder 1993; Damasio 1995: esp. 127–64; Ben-Ze'ev 2000: esp. 49–78. The important new work by Nussbaum 2001 appeared too late to be laid under contribution to this chapter, but it is clearly compatible with the cognitivist line taken here.

10 Particularly since the *TLL* articles give only a sampling of the evidence, I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by the Packard Humanities Institute CD-ROM no. 5.3 (1991) in tracing the uses of *invidia* and its cognates.


when they defined or otherwise reflected on the emotion.¹¹ At the next level, however, the most important narrative distinction is not the ancient distinction between 'active' and 'passive' that we find repeated in the lexica – between feeling *invidia* and being the object of it – but whether or not the story must be told with reference to some principle of right or fairness or the like: whether or not it is a 'moral' story, in short.

So, on the left side of the taxonomy (scripts 1 and 2), I feel *invidia* – I have an unpleasant psychosomatic experience when I see your good – not with reference to some principle of justice, but just because it is a *good* or just because it is *your* good. I suggest in Figure 12.1 a characteristic thought that could be expressed by someone acting out each script, and a thought that actually is expressed by the most fully rounded representative of these scripts in English literature, Iago, who responds quite distinctly to Desdemona's virtue (because it is *virtue*) and to Othello's happiness (because it is *Othello's*). I take it that these scripts of *invidia* will seem familiar and need no elaborate illustration: scripts 1 and 2, for example, both inform Ovid's extended personification of *Invidia* at *Metamorphoses* 2.760–832, and they are entailed in two of the most common *topoi* of *invidia*, the related notions that *invidia* frequently targets *virtus* and that *invidia* strikes the 'summits' (the pinnacles of achievement, fame and so on) just because they are the summits.¹² Further examples will be found in the discussion to follow.

On the right side of the taxonomy, by contrast, I feel *invidia* at your good only with reference to some sense of 'right'. It may be a sense of right that is self-regarding, and therefore potentially self-serving (script 3): the characteristic thought here is that the good you enjoy is *rightfully* mine. This is the script that Iago acts out in relation to Cassio, and it is the script that Virgil invokes – only to elide it – when it comes time for the archery contest at the funeral games for Anchises in *Aeneid* 5 (485–542).

11 For *invidia* described as *dolor* or *aegritudo* caused by another's advantage or success, see e.g. Cic. *De or.* 2.209, *TD* 3.20, 4.16–17, *sim. Ov. Met.* 2.780–2, *Sen. Dial.* 6.19.6, 11.9.3–9.
 12 *invidia virtutis*: e.g., *ad Herem.* 4.36, Cic. *Cat.* 1.28–9, *Balb.* 15–16, 18, *Rab. Post.* 48, *Phil.* 8.29–31, *Sall.* *BC* 3.2, 37.3, *Jug.* 10.2, [*Sall.*] *Ad Caes.* 2.8.7, 2.13.7, [*O.*] *Comm. Pet.* 39–40, *Hor. Serm.* 2.3.13, c. 3.24.31–32, 4.8.24, *Epist.* 2.1.12, *Nepos Timol.* 1.5, *Hann.* 1.2, *Livy* 2.7.4–8, 6.11.3, 8.31.2–3, 35.43.1, 38.49.5, *Prop.* 3.1.21, *Phaedr.* 3.9, 5. pr.9, *Sen. Dial.* 7.19.2, 8.8.2, *Epist.* 74.4, 79.13, 87.34, *Martial* 5.10.3, *Pliny Epist.* 1.8.6, *Pan.* 14.5, *Quint. Inst.* 3.1.21, 6. pr.10, 12.11.7, [*Quint.*] *DMai.* 3.18, *Tac. Agr.* 1.1, *Dial.* 23.6, *Ann.* 2.71, *Fronto Princ. Hist.* 2. 4. *invidia* strikes the 'summits': e.g. *Lucr.* 5.1131, *Livy* 8.31.7, 45.35.2–9, *Vell. Pat.* 1.9.6, 2.13.3, 2.40.5, 2.48.6, *Lucan* 1.70, cf. *Cic. Verr.* 2.3.98, *Val. Max.* 6.9 (ext).5, 8.1 (damm).1, *Sen. Epist.* 94.73, [*Quint.*] *DMai.* 13.2. These scripts of *invidia* as *hvor* are most relevant to the iconography of φθόνος/*invidia* discussed in the excellent survey of Dunbabin and Dickie 1983, and are at the centre of discussion in Barton 1993: 107–75.

Figure 12.1 Emotions toward the fortune of others



Aeneas, recall, has tethered a bird to a mast and promised top prize to the archer who strikes the fluttering creature. First one archer hits the mast, then another severs the tether, then Eurytion brings the bird to earth with his arrow – but still king Acestes shoots, and his arrow miraculously catches fire in mid-air and is consumed. Recognizing a portent when he sees one, Aeneas awards top prize to Acestes, and the narrator adds (539–43):

necc bonus Eurytion praelato invidit honori,
quamvis solus avem caelo deiecit ab alto.

Good Eurytion did not feel *invidia* for the *praelatus honos* – a Vergilian way of saying that he did not feel *invidia* for Acestes, who had been *praelatus*, given precedence, in honour. The comment is added because in ordinary circumstances Eurytion would have felt *invidia*, and indeed would have been quite justified in that feeling, for a prize that was rightfully his by the rules of the game had been given to another: that is the point of the final clause. But Eurytion is *bonus* here precisely because he sees that these are not ordinary circumstances and so is willing to forgo his right.

Alternatively, in script 4, the relevant sense of right has no explicit reference to oneself at all. My *dolor* derives from seeing you gain or use some good – wealth, prestige, authority or the like – in a way that affronts some general societal principle: you have behaved high-handedly, cruelly, self-indulgently or against the common good, and you damn well ought to be ashamed of yourself. That, at any rate, will be the burden of my argument in the rest of this chapter: this script of *invidia* – the script that most clearly distinguishes *invidia* from both Greek φθόνος and English ‘envy’ – is intimately connected to the emotion of shame; in this manifestation – and it is in fact *the most common* manifestation of *invidia*, by some distance – *invidia* bears the same relation to *pudor* that *vémestis* does to αἰδώς in Greek. Before I develop that argument, however, let me first briefly round off my discussion of the taxonomy by noting a few other aspects of it that seem to me important, though I cannot fully elaborate them now.

First, the taxonomy in Figure 12.1 is only partial, in the sense that it could be extended ‘downward’ in further ramifications, which I have omitted here primarily because they are not relevant to my main argument. For example, in the case of script 2, if I feel *dolor* at seeing a good because it is *your* good, I can feel that way just because it is *your* good, because it is *your* good, or I can feel that way because it is *your* good *and not mine* (that is, a distinction between a merely begrudging thought, as we might put it in English, and a thought that is both begrudging and covetous at the same

time). For another example, each of these scripts can be enacted either ‘in fact’ or, so to speak, ‘proleptically’: in the case of script 1, I can feel *dolor* at, and so ‘begrudge’ you, a good that you *in fact already possess*, just because it is a good – I can want to wipe that smile off your face, say, just because it is a smile; or I can feel *dolor* at, and so ‘begrudge’ you, a good that you *might come to possess* – I can deny you a drink of water when you are thirsty, say, just because it would quench your thirst.¹³

We should note too that the taxonomy’s constitutive scripts are not mutually exclusive – something generally true of emotional scripts, I believe, and that in two senses. First, it is obviously possible to experience different *invidia* scripts simultaneously towards different persons or states of affairs. (Iago does this very conspicuously, and it is the multifariousness of his emotion, as it elaborates the elements of the plot, that makes him the brilliant creation he is.) But it is also possible to experience different *invidia* scripts simultaneously towards the *same* person or state of affairs, a point I can illustrate with ‘the case of the negligent colleague’. Professor X shirks administrative jobs so that he will have more time to publish and feed his scholarly reputation. Worse, he even tells his graduate students his little secret: the first time you are given a committee job or the like, just mess it up – there will be no real penalty, and you will never be asked again. (X, of course, is an entirely fictional construct. . . .) Now, you know all this about X, you feel *dolor* at what you are sure is intentional, high-handed and shameful behaviour damaging to your department’s common purpose and communal ethos, and you think that he should be ashamed; at the same time, you are aware of the advantage that this behaviour brings him, and you feel *dolor* because his advantage puts you at a disadvantage in a zero-sum game: it is just not *fair* that he gets to spend more time on his research while you have less time because you have to pick up some of the slack. You are acting out versions of scripts 3 and 4, in other words. *And*, if you are a less-than-perfect human, you will perhaps at some level simultaneously feel *dolor* accompanied by the thought ‘To hell with fairness: I just wouldn’t mind being in his shoes.’ Welcome to script 2. We could say in this case that your *invidia* is rich, many-sided and overdetermined.

As a final fact about the taxonomy I note a curiosity that deserves mention though I am not able to explain it: the relevant Latin lexical items – the cognates *invidere* / *invidus* / *invidia* / *invidiosus* – are not distributed evenly among the scripts. The verb *invidere* and the adjective *invidiosus* cluster very densely on the left side of the taxonomy (the Latin

13 To take another example, what we call ‘jealousy’ – in the sense of my begrudging you a good that I have (e.g. my spouse) and do not want you to gain because it would cease to be mine – would be a ‘proleptic’ version of script 3 (my *dolor* at the anticipation of your enjoying a good that is rightfully mine). Note, however, that this sentiment in fact rather rarely appears as *invidia*.

words that correspond most directly to φθονεῖν and φθονερός): while they sometimes appear in contexts where script 3 is being acted out, *invidere* rarely appears in connection with script 4, and *invidus* never so appears. Conversely, occurrences of the adjective *invidiosus*, derived from the noun *invidia*, are concentrated on the right side of the taxonomy, though it sometimes appears in connection with script 2, especially where what we would call 'covetous thoughts' are involved. Only *invidia* appears at all commonly across the whole range of scripts. But its most common setting, as I have already mentioned, is the little drama of script 4: that is where it appears about two times in every three, to do the work done in Greek by the idea of νέμεσις. Hence my original contention that Cicero slipped into Greek to make plain a distinction that ordinary Latin would have left unclear, when he wanted to express the idea that the shameful Calpidius deserved to be the object of 'righteous indignation'; and hence my contention that script 4 is, in effect, Latin's νέμεσις-script.

Now when I make that claim I have something very specific in mind: the behaviour and concept of νέμεσις in early Greek that has been described in very similar terms by James Redfield, Douglas Cairns and Bernard Williams.¹⁴ On this view, νέμεσις stands in a precise and special relationship to αἰδώς; together they form what Redfield calls a 'reflexive pair'. If you have a proper sense of αἰδώς, you know your standing relative to others in any circumstance, you know what obligations (including obligations of respect) that standing imposes on you, and you know what obligations (including obligations of respect) that standing imposes on others relative to you. If your behaviour fails to meet those obligations, you should feel αἰδώς (which for present purposes we can call 'shame'), and in fact you *will* feel αἰδώς, unless you are what we would call 'shameless'. But whether or not you feel αἰδώς, others will certainly feel νέμεσις, a reaction 'ranging from shock, contempt, and malice to righteous rage and indignation':¹⁵ by feeling and expressing this emotion, they show that *they* have a proper sense of αἰδώς, and they try to jump-start your own sense, if it has shown itself deficient. So the two emotions are the 'inner and outer aspects of the same thing': failures of αἰδώς provoke the νέμεσις of others, and 'the *nemesis* of others evokes *aidos* in oneself'.¹⁶ The most common script of *invidia* in Latin forms with *pudor* a very similar reflexive pair.¹⁷

14 Redfield 1975: 113–19; Cairns 1993: 51–4; Williams 1993: 80–1.

15 Williams 1993: 80.

16 Redfield 1975: 116, 117.

17 Hence the present chapter can be read as a partial correction of the following claim made in Kaster 1997: 14 n. 33: 'Latin can of course express all the sentiments that νέμεσις comprises, but it has no single term that both embraces them all and forms a reflexive pair with *pudor*: *invidia* perhaps comes closest in semantic range, but it is of far broader application, and its uses have no particular association with *pudor* or *impudentia*'.

Take the following passage from Suetonius's *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* – an example of which I am particularly fond because I see only now that I did not fully understand the passage when I made my edition and commentary several years ago. Suetonius is talking about Albius Silus, a distinguished rhetorician and declaimer of the Augustan era, who combined with his teaching a very choice practice at the bar. Herc is what Suetonius says, in my published translation (Kaster: 1995, 37):¹⁸

He also argued cases in court, but that quite rarely, since he sought only the most substantial cases, and even then would take on no part of a case save the conclusion. (4) He later withdrew from the forum, partly out of shame and partly out of fear. For on the occasion of a suit before the centumviral court, when he was attacking his opponent for impiety towards his parents, he offered the man the opportunity to swear an oath 'Swear,' he said, 'by the ashes of your father and mother, which lie unburied!'; with some other remarks along these lines, intending none of them to be taken literally – whereupon the man took him up on the offer and the judges allowed it, so that *he made a botch of his case, incurring substantial ill will in the process.* (5) And on another occasion he was defending a man on trial for murder before the proconsul Lucius Piso at Mediolanum: as the lictors sought to quiet the excessive cries of his admirers, he flew into such a rage that – having lamented the condition of Italy, which he claimed was being reduced once again to the status of a mere province – he topped things off by invoking Marcus Brutus, whose statue was in sight of the courtroom, as the source and defender of laws and liberty, and he very nearly paid the penalty.

The general point and structure are clear. As an advocate, Albius was a prima donna who not only wished to perform the most desirable role (the role of summation) in the most desirable cases but who also was given to

18 Suet. *Gramm.* 30.3 5 (Albius Silus): 'egit et causas, verum rarius, dum amplissimam quamque sectatur, nec alium in ulla locum quam perorandi. (4) postea renuntiavit foro partim pudore, partim metu: nam cum in lite quadam centumviri adversario, quem ut impium erga parentes incessebat, ius iurandum quasi per figuram sic obtulisset – "iura per patris matrisque cineres, qui inconditi iacent!" et alia in hunc modum – arripiente eo condicionem nec iudicibus aspernantibus, non sine magna sua invidia negotium afflixit. (5) et rursus in cognitione caedis Mediolani apud L. Pisonem proconsulem defendens reum, cum cohererent lictores nimias laudantium voces et ita excaudisset ut – deplorato Italiae statu, quasi iterum in formam provinciae redigeretur – M. insuper Brutum, cuius statua in conspectu erat, invocaret legum ac libertatis auctorem et vindicem, paene poenas luit.' The anecdote in §4, discussed below, is probably derived from Sen. *Controversiae* 7. pr. 6f. (cf. also Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.95).

untimely and self-indulgent displays, with lamentable results: he withdrew from the forum partly out of shame and partly out of fear. Suetonius says, and then he cites two anecdotes to bear out his contention.

The second anecdote obviously has to do with *metus*: what Suetonius depicts as Albius' brush with death when he threw a tantrum and called upon the memory of Caesar's murderer in a courtroom ultimately under the authority of Caesar's heir. The first anecdote has to do with *pudor* and with *invidia*; it turns on a technical point of civil law.¹⁹ Seeking to bring the opprobrium of *impietas* upon his opponent, Albius called on the man to swear an oath by his parents' ashes, allegedly unburied; but while making a florid gesture that would be just the thing in a declamation, he failed to reflect that under the rules of civil procedure, the party offered the oath could win the case merely by swearing the oath in the form offered. So he made a mess of the case, and incurred great *invidia* in the process. Here the translator's choice of 'ill will', while perhaps intelligible, is rather lame and insipid. It scarcely approaches the real thought behind *invidia* in this little drama, which I take to be something like this: viewing the wreckage of the case, an onlooker would be inclined to think, 'Well now, look at Mister Big-Shot Professor, with his big reputation and his pick of juicy cases—he's so wrapped up in himself and his cute tricks, he screws up by making a schoolboy mistake: he oughta be ashamed of himself!' And so, Suetonius assures us, he was.

This is *véμεσις*-script *invidia* at work, and its link with 'shameful' behaviour is strong and clear as far back as we can trace the concept *invidia*. Let me offer just a few more illustrations, starting with our earliest example of continuous Latin prose, the preface to Cato's *De agricultura*, in which he famously compares farming with trade and money-lending (pr. 1–4):

Est < o > interdum praestare mercaturis rem quaerere, nisi tam periculosum sit, et item fenerari, si tam honestum sit. maiores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt: furem dupli condemnari, feneratorum quadrupli . . . mercatorem autem strenuum studio sumque rei quaerendae existimo, verum, ut supra dixi, periculosum et calamitosum. at ex agricolis et viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi gignuntur, maximeque pius quaestus stabilissimusque consequitur minimeque invidiosus minimeque male cogitantes sunt qui in eo studio occupati sunt.

The problem with trade, he says, is that it is insufficiently secure, while the problem with money-lending is that it is insufficiently honourable. Farming, by contrast, is a 'maxime . . . pius quaestus stabilissimusque . . .

19 On the technicality see Kaster 1995: 322.

minimeque invidiosus': it avoids the insecurity inherent in trade and the *invidia* that clings to money-lending—the feeling that those who engage in it are in fact worse than thieves, that like thieves they are violating a social norm and should be ashamed of themselves.

This script of *invidia* responds to the gaining or use of an advantage in a way deemed socially destructive and discreditable; accordingly, the script appears in contexts as varied as the forms of socially destructive and discreditable behaviour itself. Some other examples, very briefly:

1. Defending Caelius, Cicero says that he will not ask that the indulgence owed to youth be extended to his client: no, no, it may be that *other* members of the *jeunesse dorée* lead lives of self-indulgence, going into debt, surrendering to *petulantia* and *libidines*, and thereby incurring the *magna invidia* owed to *vitia* and *peccata*—but *not* his blameless client!²⁰
2. Speaking of himself, Cicero returns repeatedly during the last twenty years of his life to the *invidia* directed at him as a result of his role in suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy, a role in which—on this view—he exercised his authority high-handedly and against the interest of the *res publica*.²¹
3. In a structurally identical circumstance, the dictator Cornelius Cossus suffers *invidia* for imprisoning the seditious Manlius Capitolinus in 385 BC: as Livy tells the story, the triumph over the Volsci that Cossus celebrated at the same time as Manlius' imprisonment was read by much of the plebs as symbolic not of his glorious victory over a *hostis* but of his arrogant and shameful abuse of power in dealing with a *civis*.²²
4. Or take the humiliating charade in which Agricola, according to Tacitus, was forced to perform: when Domitian's agents made it

20 Cic. *Cael.* 30: 'itaque ego severitati tuae ita ut oportet respondere non audeo. erat enim meum deprecari vacationem adulescentiae veniamque petere: non, inquam, audeo; per fugis nihil utor aetatis, concessa omnibus iura dimitto; tantum peto ut, si qua est *invidia communis hoc tempore aeris alieni, petulantiae, libidinum inven-tutis, quam video esse magnam, tamen ne huic aliena peccata, ne aetatis ac temporum vitia noceant.*'

21 Cicero *Cat.* 1. 22: 'tametsi video, si mea voce perterritus ire in exsilium animum induxeris, quanta tempestas *invidiae* nobis, si minus in praesens tempus recentis memoria scelerum tuorum, at in posteritatem impendeat'; cf. *Cat.* 1.28–9, 2.3, 15, 3.3, 28–9, *Sall.* 9, 33, *Dom.* 44, *Har. Resp.* 61, *Pis.* 72, *Mil.* 82, *Phil.* 3.18, *Leg.* 3.26, *sim.* *Sall.* *BC* 22.3, 43.1, *Suet.* *Jul.* 14.1.

22 Livy 6.16.5: 'coniecto in carcerem Manlio satis constat magnam partem plebis vestem mutasse, multos mortales capillum ac barbam promississe, obversatamque vestibulo carceris maestam turbam. *dictator de Volscis triumphavit, invidiamque magis triumphus quam gloriae fuit*; quippe domi non militiae partum cum actumque de cive non de hoste fremebant: unum defuisse tantum superbiae, quod non M. Manlius ante curram sit ductus.'

plain that it was not prudent for him to seek the proconsulship of Africa or Asia that he deserved, he first had to beg to be 'excused' – and then had to thank the emperor for the 'favour'. Domitian's role in the charade, and the hollow *beneficium* he extended, were shameful and so, appropriately, the object of *invidia*: but of course the shameless Domitian did not blush.²³

5. And as a final example, consider epigram 3.21 of Martial: a slave who had been branded on the forehead as a punishment saved his master's life during the prosecutions – a gift, in the event, not of *vita* but of *invidia*.²⁴ The thought is that only a cruel and abusive master would mistreat so loyal a slave; and so, in Shackleton Bailey's translation, 'This was not saving his master's life but putting him to shame.'

Now the slave in this last tale, I take it, did not *intend* to put his master to shame. That is rather the unintended consequence of his action, as it is interpreted by a notional set of onlookers: placing the action in a larger, implied narrative of past actions (the master's, the slave's), the onlookers construct and act out an emotional script that then connects them to that larger narrative. This is the way our emotional scripts tie us to the narratives of each other's lives. In the case of *invidia*, an 'onlooker' is always at least implied, just because it is *invidia*, linked by etymology and actuality to 'seeing'; and this essential link to 'seeing' explains the intimate connection of *invidia* with 'shame', which depends on (among other things) the sense of seeing yourself being seen under some discreditable description.²⁵

So all of *véμεσις*-script *invidia* implies a performance observed and judged. Furthermore, much of *véμεσις*-script *invidia* – and I think the most interesting part – is the result of *managed* performances, the more or

23 Tacitus *Agr.* 42.1–2: 'accessere quidam cogitationum principis periti. . . ac primo occultius quietem et otium laudare, mox operam suam in adprobanda excusatione offerre, postremo non iam obscuri suadentes simul terrentesque pertraxere ad Domitianum. qui paratus simulatione, in adrogantiam compositus, et auditus preces excusantis et, cum admississet, agi sibi gratias passus est, nec erubuit beneficii invidia.'

24 Martial 3.21: 'proscriptum famulus servavit fronte notatus. / Non fuit haec domini vita, sed invidia'; cf. Val. Max. 6.8.7 (on the escape of Antius Restio, the presumed model for Martial's poem): 'ipse [sc. servus], nihil aliud quam umbra et imago suppliciorum suorum, maximum esse emolumentum eius a quo tam graviter punitus erat salutem iudicavit, cumque abunde foret iram remittere, adiecit etiam caritatem'.

25 For one approach to the Roman sense of 'shame', see Kaster 1997. For the dependence of the emotion not on being seen (either actually or notionally), but on seeing *oneself* being seen (either actually or notionally), see the important remarks of Taylor 1985: 60–1, which are consistent with the Roman evidence.

less stylised and ritualised forms of behaviour by which one person seeks to arouse shaming *invidia* against another. Consider the following tabulation:

1. *Arousing invidia* in 'formal' settings:
 - a. in *contiones*: Cic. *Verr.* 1.1.1–2, *Cluent.* 93 (cf. 95), *Att.* 1.16.1, *Ascon. Mil.* pp. 28, 32, 45, Val. Max. 5.7.2, cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.72 4, *ND* 3.3, *Lucull.* 144, *Off.* 3.79, Livy 3.11.10, 4.40.5, Plin. *Epist.* 9.13.4;
 - b. in the senate: Ateius Capito *uirisprud. frag.* 4 (on Caesar and Cato), Livy 26.32.5, Suet. Aug. 43.1–2, cf. Tac. *Hist.* 4.41;
 - c. in appeals to the *corona* in a *iudicium*: Cic. *Flacc.* 66, 69;
 - d. in military settings: Tac. *Hist.* 1.82, *Ann.* 1.23, Suet. *Cal.* 9.1.
2. *Arousing invidia* in 'informal' settings:
 - a. through forms of *flagitatio*: Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.41, Quint. *DMin.* 279.16, 316.4, 11, 318.4, [Quint.] *DMai.* 9.18, 18.9, Tac. *Ann.* 11.34, 16.10, cf. Petron. *Sat.* 14.6–7, 101.3, 107.10, DServ. ad *Aen.* 2.124 ("flagitat" id est "invidiose poscit", unde et quod flagitatione dignum est flagitium dicitur);
 - b. by carrying (vel sim.) the emperor's image 'in *invidiam alterius*': Tac. *Ann.* 3.36, *Dig.* 47.10.38.pr., 48.19.28.7 (cf. 28.5.92.pr.), cf. Ov. *Met.* 13.408–14;
 - c. through physical displays (showing scars, dressing in mourning, etc.): Livy 2.23.1–7, 3.58.8, Sen. *Contr.* 10. 1. 9 (on dressing in mourning; cf. Stat. *Theb.* 6.41–4) with *Dig.* 47.10.15.27 (cf. *ibid.* §6), Plin. *NH* 28.148;
 - d. through suicide: Sen. *Contr.* 7.3.4, 10.3.15, Quint. 9.2.85–6, Quint. *DMin.* 337.1–2 (cf. 317.13, [Quint.] *DMai.* 17.4), Tac. *Ann.* 3.16, 6.29, 12.8, cf. Suet. *Cal.* 56.1, Serv. ad *Ecl.* 8.60;
 - e. through other dramatic gestures of 'shaming': Livy 37.57.15 (withdrawal from competition for *honos*), Ov. *Met.* 8.142–4, Sen. *Contr.* 10.1.1 (throwing oneself at another's knees), Frontin. *Strateg.* 4.5.1 (Pompey flings down his *fascies*), Quint. *DMin.* 283.2 (a Cynic son 'shames' his father by begging for food), 294.8, [Quint.] *DMai.* 19.4 (a mother's mourning arouses *miseratio* for herself and *invidia* against her husband), 19.9 (a father tortures his son to shame an entire *populus*), Apul. *Apol.* 25 (reading a letter aloud in the forum);
 - f. through more subtle gestures of 'shaming' (esp. to arouse *invidia* against high-handed displays of *potentia*): D. Brutus ap. Cic. *Fam.* 11.1.6 (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.62.3), *Ascon. Mil.* p. 31 (on Milo and Pompey), Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.15–16 (behaving submissively to highlight another's oppression, cf. 9.2.8),

Quint. *DMm.* 301.13 (self-humiliation), [Quint.] *DMai.* 1.16 (bringing *invidia* against a step-mother's *odium*), 5.21 (a son's denying *alimenta* to his father, cf. also 16.5-6), Sen. *Dial.* 6.14.2 (on Bibulus' 'seclusion', cf. Vell. Pat. 2.44.5; cf. also Suet. *Nero* 34.1, Nero 'burdens' his mother with *invidia* by threatening to withdraw to Rhodes), Sen. *Contr.* 9.5.9 (a grandfather's visit to his ailing grandsons brings *invidia* on the father, cf. §11), Tac. *Ann.* 13.15 (the song of Britannicus: 'unde orta miseria manifestior. . . Nero intellecta invidia odium intendit').

Merely skimming this catalogue is enough to show that these performances are both very common and very rich in their diversity. But there is one thought common to them all: I feel *invidia* towards this person because he (almost always, he) is shamefully abusing his favourable circumstance, and I am going to make you feel the same thing – or in the idiom that occurs scores of times, I am going to *invidiam facere*, create this *invidia* in you towards the other.²⁶ The emotion, and the performances that it inspires, thus produce a type of social glue, reinforcing certain kinds of judgement and unifying a group against a renegade. Let's just glance briefly at some of these performances, which (for the sake of convenience only) are sorted in the catalogue above according to the 'formality' and 'informality' of their setting – roughly, the degree of their institutionalisation.

So, for example, there is the highly structured setting of the *contio*, the address to a gathering of the people that could be convened only by a magistrate or priest. The *contio* is the formal space for creating *véμεσις-invidia* under the Republic, where the *contio* is to *invidia* what the *iudicium* is to *crimen*: the *contio* aims to create a consensus that someone has done something for which he should be ashamed; the *iudicium* creates the formal judgement that he has done something for which he should be punished. But the *contio* is only a highly regulated instance of the sort of performance that filled the open spaces of public life every day, as the streets and marketplaces of great cities and small towns witnessed a lively theatre of outrage and shame. The *flagitatio* and related forms of semi-ritualised behaviour provide a cluster of examples. Following someone about and loudly proclaiming that they had abused you was obviously intended to achieve your purpose not only by encouraging your abuser to reflect on the error of his ways, but especially by making him feel the *invidia* of others – by bringing to bear against him the glances of witnesses who would see him for the high-handed or cruel person that he was. A

26 Drawing attention to this idiom was a great merit of Wistrand 1946.

similar kind of theatrical coup is brilliantly evoked by Apuleius in his *Apology* (25), where he recounts how his main persecutor came into the forum of Oea, breathless and distraught, and read out to the gathered crowd part of a letter by Apuleius' wife, Pudentilla, in which her 'enchantment' was supposedly revealed.

The performance, however, could be no less effective for being wordless. Following someone around town dressed in mourning is a way of creating *invidia* that appears not only in the semi-fictional world of declamation (Sen. *Contr.* 10.1.9) but in the *Digest*, where it is expressly forbidden (47.10.15.27, cf. *ibid.* §6); similarly forbidden is any use of the emperor's image in *invidiam alterius* – with a view to expressing or creating *invidia* against someone – say, by carrying the image to invoke the emperor's protection against an overbearing other (*Dig.* 47.10.38.pr., 48.19.28.7, cf. 28.5.92.pr.). In all these performances the crucial move is to cast yourself in the role of victim. That is what you do when you publicly throw yourself at the knees of another, not only to arouse his pity but to threaten him with others' shaming *invidia* if he spurns your plea. It is what Bibulus did when he withdrew to his house during his consulship, to bring *invidia* against the high-handedness of his colleague, Caesar (Sen. *Dial.* 6.14.2, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.44.5). According to Tacitus (*Ann.* 3.16), it is what Tiberius complained the elder Piso had done in committing suicide, and it is what Caligula did when he brought *magna invidia* upon a group of senators suspected of conspiring against him, in effect by taking himself hostage (*Cal.* 56.1): drawing his sword, he offered to kill himself right there if they thought he deserved it (one imagines the senators' mixed emotions). And it is what Britannicus did in the game that ensured his death (Tac. *Ann.* 13.15): called on to sing a song at a celebration of the Saturnalia, he chose lyrics that alluded to the denial of his patrimony – a choice that aroused pity for him and *invidia* for Nero. But perverse creature that Nero was, he did not feel the shame that such *invidia* should have aroused, but only heightened *odium* – the hostility most appropriate when you have been done a personal *iniuria*.

All these performances attempt to marshal emotion against someone judged guilty of misusing an advantage or a position of superiority. It is structurally fitting, therefore, to find almost identical performances mounted in relations with the divine, to arouse *invidia* against the gods when they have let us mortals down.²⁷ Not surprisingly, death provides

27 Creating *invidia* against the gods: in connection with death and mourning, see [Ov.] *Epicad. Drusi* 187-90, Ov. *Met.* 4.543-8, Val. Max. 2.6.7, Lucan 2.28-36, Sen. *Herc. Oet.* 1857-62, *Dial.* 6.17.7 ('freeing' the gods from *invidia*, in connection with the varied fortune of raising children), Stat. *Silv.* 5.3.69-70 (- 5.5.78), *Theb.* 3.195-8, 9.722-3, [Quint.] *DMai.* 8.14, 10.9; for a failure to protect one's city or holy precincts, see Porph. ad Hor. *Carm.* 1.2.35-6, Serv. ad *Aen.* 2.326.

the most common context: the high emotional energy of mourning is conceived as expressing not only the mourners' own pain and loss, and not only their attachment to the deceased, but also their outrage toward the gods for having caused or allowed such a thing. When mourners weep and cry out, tear their clothing or their hair, they are among other things trying to shame the gods, a point made helpfully explicit in the *Epicedion Driasi* (187–90):

Dique latent templis neque iniqua ad funera vultus

Præbent nec poscunt tura ferenda rogo:

Obscuros delubra tenent; pudet ora colentum

Aspicere invidiæ, quam meruere, metu.

The gods stay hidden in their precincts and do not show their faces at the cruel funeral, they do not demand an offering of incense at the pyre:

their shrines keep them out of sight, (the thought of) looking their worshippers in the face causes them *pudor*, for fear of the *invidia* that they have deserved.

But any situation in which the gods let us down – and the possibilities are beyond number – is a suitable occasion for *invidiam facere* against them. So Juvenal imagines that the inhabitants of Memphis might turn to cannibalism (the theme of satire 15) to create *invidia* against the Nile if it refused to rise (122–3, 'anne aliam terra Memphis sicca / invidiam facerent nolenti surgere Nilo?'); that is, they would act out as vividly as possible the circumstances in which the Nile's outrageous and shameful refusal had placed them.

I hope that I have given reason enough to link this script of *invidia* with *véμεσις*, specifically in relation to the emotion that we call 'shame'. I will conclude by offering some observations on the relation of this script to the other forms of *invidia* that in general are comparable to *φθόνος*; my

DServ. ad *Aen.* 2.365, 2.602 (Venus 'purging' the *invidia* against her), 3.3; for failures to keep a 'bargain', see Juv. 15.122–3, cf. Ov. *Met.* 7.603–5, DServ. ad *Aen.* 4.204 (on Iarbas); for assorted other 'injustices', see Ov. *Am.* 3.3.17–18 (*di* generalized), 3.6.21–2 (a river in flood), *Rem.* 17–20 (Cupid), *Pont.* 3.3.23–8 (Cupid), *Pont.* 3.6.15–16 (Augustus, whom Ovid 'defends'), Sil. *Pun.* 6.396–402. For one god creating *invidia* against another, see Ovid *Met.* 5.512–15 (Ceres before Jupiter, on behalf of Proserpina), Stat. *Theb.* 7.193–4 (with the preceding speech of Bacchus), DServ. ad *Aen.* 1.230, Serv. ad *Aen.* 5.782, 10.20 (and *passim* in this speech). For a god 'swayed' by (anticipated) *invidia*, see Martial 1.12 (Fortuna), 7.47 (Dis), but see also 9.86 (since even the gods cannot save 'their own' from death, they do not merit *invidia* – that is, they do not enjoy the requisite 'advantage'), Stat. *Silv.* 3.5.40–2.

argument here is that 'véμεσις-script *invidia*' commonly functions in Roman social and emotional life as the rhetorically useful complement to 'φθόνος-script *invidia*'.

Consider, first, one feature of the practice just described, that of creating *invidia* against the gods. In all these cases it is obvious that creating *invidia* against the gods entails ascribing *invidia* to the gods. The aggrieved party is trying to arouse *véμεσις*-script *invidia* against them by accusing them of φθόνος-style feelings: if your son or wife dies or the Nile refuses to rise, it is not because you or your loved ones have deserved it, or because the gods or fate or the Nile were just having a bad day; it is because the gods or fate or the Nile were feeling *invidia* – they were, as we would put it, intentionally begrudging you the good that you desired. And that is in fact *exactly* how the *invidia deorum* is most commonly conceived in Latin, and how the Roman concept differs from the φθόνος τῶν θεῶν of late archaic and classical Greece. The gods of Aeschylus, Pindar and Herodotus are said to feel φθόνος for an Eastern potentate or a Greek tyrant because he seeks or threatens to surpass the lot of the merely mortal and rival the gods themselves.²⁸ But while there are traces of this conception in Roman thought as well (with reference to Hannibal or Alexander, for example),²⁹ the *invidia* that our texts most often ascribe to the gods is the feeling that motivates you to deprive another of a good just because it is a good, or just because you do not want the other to have it.³⁰ That the gods are so commonly taken to act out φθόνος-script *invidia* makes them plausible targets of *véμεσις*-script *invidia*.

28 See e.g. Walcot 1978: 46–9; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 69–70; Bulman 1992: 32–4 (differently Rakoczy 1996: 247–70).

29 Livy 5.21.15 (cf. 5.27.12) – Val. Max. 1.5.2, Livy 30.30.30 (Hannibal), Curt. Ruf. 6.2.18–19 (Alexander), 8.5.20, 10.5.9–11, Sen. *Epist.* 73.16 (denied), Sil. *Pun.* 7.57–61, 15.510–12, Quint. *Inst.* 6.pr.10.

30 That is, script 1 or script 2 *invidia*, comparable to *livor* or βλακωνία: the gods at (e.g.) *Carm. Epigr.* 54.2–3 (act. Sull.), Prop. 1.12.7–9, Vell. Pat. 1.10.4, Lucan 4.243–5, 9.64–6, Sil. *Pun.* 4.397–400, 12.236–8, 14.580–84, Val. Flacc. 2.375–7, 3.306–8, Florus 1.7 (divine *invidia* of this sort is *denied* at Ov. *Am.* 3.10.5–6, Val. Max. 2.6.7, Sen. *Ben.* 2.28. 1–29, 6, Tac. *Germ.* 33. 1); *fatium* or *faia* at (e.g.) Ov. *Pont.* 2.8.57–60, Sen. *Apoc.* 3.2, Lucan 1.70–2, Phaedr. 5.6, Plin. *NH* 35.92 (sim. 35.156), Martial 9.76.6–8, 10.53, 12.14.7–8, Stat. *Theb.* 10.384–5, *Silv.* 2.1.120–2, [Quint.] *DMai.* 8.10. Cf. the abstract *invidia* or personified *Invidia* at Sall. *Iug.* 55.3, Hor. *Serm.* 2.1.74–8, Curt. Ruf. 4.5.1–3, Sen. *Dial.* 6.13.3, Stat. *Silv.* 2.1.121–2, 2.6.68–70, 4.8.15–7, 5.1.137–8, *Achill.* 1.143–6, Martial 5.6.3–5, Sil. *Pun.* 17.187–9, Apul. *Met.* 4.14, 4.34, 7.6 (and the formula 'absit Invidia / invidia (verbo)' at Livy 9.19.15, 28.39.11, 36.7.7, Curt. Ruf. 10.2.24, 10.9.6). More generally, *invidia Fortunæ* (the commonplace quality of the thought is suggested by the prevalence of rhetorical/declamatory texts and texts strongly influenced by declamation): ad *Herem.* 4.44 (in exemplo), Catull. 64.169–70, Sall. *BC* 58.21 (speech of Catiline), Verg. *Aen.* 11.42–4 (cf. Serv. ad *Aen.* 9.212), Manil. 4.564–5, Lucan 1.82–4, 4.503–4, Sen. *HF* 524–5, *Dial.* 6.16.6, Plin. *NH* 28.39, 37.3, Val. Flacc. 2.473–4, Flor. 2.13, Juv. 15.93–6, Calp. Flacc. 42, [Quint.] *DMai.* 6.8.

What is true of the gods is true of the human overclass as well, as we see, for example, in the conception of the *invidia* that members of the nobility are so commonly said to feel for 'new men' in the late Republic. Take the following remarks:

Ea res in primis studia hominum adcedit ad consulatum mandandum M. Tullio Cicero. namque antea pleraque nobilitas *invidia aestuabat, et quasi pollui consulatum credebant, si eum quamvis egregius homo novus adeptus foret, sed ubi periculum advenit, invidia atque superbia post fuerat.*

These circumstances above all fired people's eagerness to entrust the consulship to M. Tullius Cicero. For previously most of the notables had been seething with *invidia* and thought the consulship was being, so to speak, polluted, were a new man to gain it, however distinguished he might be. But with danger present, *invidia* and *superbia* took a back seat.

To those unsympathetic to the *nobiles* – Sallust speaking here of Cicero (*BC* 23.5–6), say, or Cicero speaking repeatedly of himself – this is basest φθόνοϛ-script *invidia*.³¹ From this perspective, the notables wish to deny the new man a good, not with reference to some principle of justice (indeed, their begrudgement is the very opposite of *aequitas*), but because they do not want the new man to have it, or because they want it for themselves, or both. And as in the case of the gods, so in the case of the *nobiles* the two main styles of *invidia* are complementary: attributing φθόνοϛ-script *invidia* to the notables is a move in creating νέμεσιϛ-script *invidia* against them.

But these two styles of *invidia* are complementary in a second and perhaps more interesting way. When Sallust, for example, glosses the notables' *invidia* by saying that they 'thought the consulship was being, so to speak, polluted' by the likes of Cicero, he purports to give us their point of view. He focalises the emotion through the *nobiles*, adds a dash of hyperbolic metaphor ('pollution'), and then uses the focalised hyperbole as a stick with which to thrash them. Their arrogant fastidiousness only compounds their φθόνοϛ, and so we are all the more right to feel νέμεσιϛ-*invidia* towards them: these *nobiles*, they ought to be ashamed of themselves. But strip away the hyperbole and retain the basic thought of the

31 For Cicero on himself, see *Verr.* 2.5.181–2, *Leg. Agr.* 2.103, *Mur.* 17, *Sull.* 23, *Fam.* 1.7.7–8 (sim. [Q. Cic.] *Comment. Petit.* 13); and on other *novi homines*, *Cluent.* 69, *Balb.* 18, *Planc.* 60, *Phil.* 9.4. Cf. on Marius, *Sall. Iurg.* 85.18, *Livy Perioch.* 68, [Quint.] *DMai.* 3.18; sim. *Livy* 9.46.1–10 (Cn. Flavius Cn. filius scriba), *Val. Max.* 3.4.2 (Tarquinius Priscus), *Nep. Eum.* 7. 1–2.

focalised emotion: it is not implausible that at least some *nobiles* did feel *invidia* – and from their perspective, with complete justification – as νέμεσιϛ-*invidia*. The new man thrusting himself forward was an outrageous disruption of the accepted order and of the common good, which it was the notables' proper place to define and defend: these *novi homines*, they ought to be ashamed of themselves. And so the complementary scripts of *invidia* confront each other as adversaries: 'You're just feeling *invidia*', I say; to which you reply, 'Damn right I do – and any decent person would feel the same.'

The complementary relation of *invidia*-scripts thus means that we commonly find the emotion pitted against itself, explicitly or by implication, in the texts that represent it. I will close by offering three examples of increasing richness to show how this is so: the examples could easily be multiplied fifty-fold and more.

In the first, transparent example the elder Pliny relates how the freedman C. Furius Cresimus enjoyed much greater yields on his small plot of land than his neighbours did on their much larger holdings; and so he came to be in *magna invidia* – he became the object of great *invidia* – as though he had charmed his neighbors' crops onto his own land (*NH* 18.41): 'C. Furius Cresimus e servitute liberatus, cum in parvo admodum agello largiores multo fructus perciperet, quam ex amplissimis vicinitas, in *invidia* erat magna, ceu fruges alienas perliceret veneficis.' Expressly, the *invidia* seems to be focalised through the neighbours, giving their point of view: *they* could properly feel νέμεσιϛ-*invidia*, because using magic to 'seduce' the crops of others meant gaining an advantage in a high-handed, outrageous and shameful way.³² But from a more distinterested perspective, the *magna invidia* in question just as clearly follows the φθόνοϛ-script: the charge of magic is obviously a way for the neighbours to veil their own naked envy, as they measure Cresimus's crops against their own and find the assessment painful. From this point of view, the anecdote reminds us that slander is the tribute that malice pays to shame.³³

My second example shows us Cicero deploying the dynamics of *invidia*, with the polemical mastery we would expect, in his campaign against Gabinius (*Sest.* 93):

cum sciat . . . Gabinium . . . haurire cotidie ex pacatissimis atque opulentissimis Syriae gazis innumerabile pondus auri, bellum in ferre quiescentibus, ut eorum veteres inlibatasque divitias in pro-

32 In fact the practice was forbidden in the XII Tables, as Pliny himself indicates at *NH* 28.17: 'quid? non et legum ipsarum in duodecim tabulis verba sunt: "QVI FRVGES EXCANTASSIT"' (*XII Tab.* 8.8a, *FR4* p. 30).

33 Weische 1966: 92–102 discusses the relation between *invidia* and διαβολή.

fundissimum libidinum suarum gurgitem profundat, villam aedificare in oculis omnium tantam tugurium ut iam videatur esse illa villa quam ipse tribunus plebis pictam olim in contionibus explicabat, quo fortissimum ac summum civem in invidiam homo castus ac non cupidus vocaret.

As governor, we are told, Gabinius drained the wealth of Syria to build a villa so magnificent that it dwarfed the villa of Lucullus, which he had assailed as tribune in 67, to bring *invidia* upon its owner. There are at least three layers of *invidia* here. First, a tribune who was in fact 'castus ac non cupidus' could credibly condemn the luxury and self-indulgence of a magnate and use the *contio* to cry 'Shame!': as we have seen, arousing *νέμεσις-invidia* was one of the important purposes a *contio* could serve. But of course the phrase 'castus ac non cupidus' is sarcastic, and we know that Cicero's Gabinius was not that sort of tribune. Rather, we are to understand that he was a hypocrite: while seeking to arouse *νέμεσις-invidia* against the wealthy, he was himself seeing with *φθόνοσ-invidia*, coveting the very thing that he was decrying. And now that Gabinius has achieved more-than-Lucullan luxury, Cicero himself of course uses the episode to arouse *νέμεσις-invidia* against the man – one of his chief occupations in the years 56–55.

My last example comes from how to put it? – a less subtle pen than Cicero's, that of Valerius Maximus; but it none the less has intriguing layers of its own. In his chapter 'De humanitate et clementia', Valerius tells us of Caesar's respectful treatment, first of Pompey's head, then of Cato's estate; and he relates Caesar's remark on hearing of Cato's suicide, that each had felt *invidia* for the other's glory.³⁴ Valerius's report virtually compels us to focalise the *invidia* in three different ways. For Valerius himself, *invidere* almost certainly has the watered-down sense that it often does, similar to the English idiom that allows one friend to say to another 'Oh, I envy you that vacation', expressing the covetous judgement of envy without engaging the psychosomatic responses that give the emotion its force and flavour: that is, Cato and Caesar would each simply have been glad to have the other's *gloria*. This is entirely consistent with Valerius's overall historical sensibility, sentimental and soaked in kitsch as it is, which probably imagined Cato and Caesar downing a few pints together in the afterlife, letting bygones be bygones, and shaking their heads over old times.

34 Val. Max. 5.1.10: 'Catonis quoque morte Caesar audita et se illius gloriae invidere et illum suae invidisse dixit patrimoniumque eius Iberis ipsius incolum servavit. et hercule divinorum Caesaris operum non parva pars Catonis salus fuisse.' Bloomer 1992: 211–12 contrasts Valerius's report with those in Plutarch (*Cato* 72) and Cassius Dio (43.12.1) and rightly notes how this version 'slant[s] the episode to Caesar's favor'.

As for Caesar, it is I suppose conceivable that he meant something of the sort that Valerius intended. But Caesar was, after all, also the author of the *Anticato*, a vicious posthumous polemic, and he is unlikely to have said that he coveted Cato's *gloria*. Far likelier, instead, that he had a more realistic and hard-nosed understanding of the emotion, as entailing sheer begrudgment: he and Cato each felt pain at the other's glory just because it *was* the other's glory.³⁵

And what of Cato's *invidia*? Well of course, as a good Stoic, Cato should have felt no *invidia* – nor any other passion – at all. Still, if we imagine for a moment that Cato was human, we might suppose that he, like Caesar, did feel the begrudgment of *φθόνοσ-invidia*. But we will also remember that suicide – the one act for which Cato was most renowned – was among the performances by which you could express *and* create *νέμεσις-invidia* against someone whose advantage was gained or used in high-handed, outrageous and shameful ways – adjectives that surely capture Cato's view of Caesar's *gloria*. We might then imagine his agreement with Cicero, that 'τὸ νέμεσᾶν interest τοῦ φθονεῖν': *invidia* is one thing, *invidia* quite another.

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- 35 Cf. Cassius Dio's version: 'Caesar said that he was angry with [Cato] because he had begrudged Caesar the glory of having spared him' (ὁ δὲ δὴ Καῖσαρ ἔκεινῳ μὲν ὀργίζεσθαι ἔφη ὅτι οἱ τῆς ἐπὶ τῇ σωτηρίᾳ αὐτοῦ εὐκλείας ἐφθόνησε).

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PROGRAMME OF THE SECOND A. G. LEVENTIS GREEK CONFERENCE

THE RIVALROUS EMOTIONS IN ANCIENT GREECE: ENVY, SPITE AND JEALOUSY

Friday 2 March 2001

9.45 a.m. Registration

10.20 a.m. Welcome by Dr Keith Rutter

First session – Envy, Spite and Jealousy

(Chair: Dr Ruth Caston, University of California, Davis)

10.30 a.m. Professor Christopher Gill (University of Exeter)

In what ethical framework does spite belong? Or mapping the vices of rivalry in Greek

11.30 a.m. Professor David Konstan (Brown University; Leventis Visiting Professor)

Envy into jealousy

12.10 p.m. Discussion

Second Session – Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle

(Chair: Professor Dori Scaltsas, University of Edinburgh)

2.00 p.m. Dr Fritz Gregor Herrmann (University of Edinburgh)

Envy in the world of Plato's Timaeus

2.40 p.m. Dr Cristina Viano (University of Paris, Sorbonne)

On the thumos of Aristotle

3.50 p.m. Professor Aaron Ben Ze'ev (University of Haifa)

Aristotle's account of emotions towards the fortune of others

4.30 p.m. Discussion